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A Matter of Fit:
The Law of Discrimination and the
Science of Implicit Bias
DAVID L. FAIGMAN*
NILANJANA DASGUPTA**
CECILIA L. RIDGEWAY***

INTRODUCTION

Integrating the insights gleaned from scientific research into the
framework of the law requires courts to appreciate the empirical
complexities of the former and the analytical details of the latter. This is
no simple feat. It requires juxtaposing the lessons and limitations of
science with the demands of the law. This feat has proved particularly
nettlesome-or, at least, controversial-in regard to the degree to which
scientific research on implicit bias, or stereotypes, helps discrimination
claims under Title VII. This subject presents a wide cross section of the
challenges endemic to the connection between law and science, including
ambiguity regarding the meaning of the law, inherent limitations in
studying the subject of implicit bias, enigmatic interpretations of research
data, and imperfect correspondence between the reach of science and the
precepts of the law. A fair evaluation of the relevance of research on
implicit bias demands a clear exposition of the law, close examination of
* John F. Digardi Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of
the Law.
** Associate Professor of Psychology, University of Massachusetts Amherst.
* Lucie Stern Professor of Sociology, Stanford University.
I. Compare Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of
Mindreading, 67 OHIo ST. L.J. 1023, 1056-58 (2oo6) (singling out the Implicit Association Test for
particular approbation, the authors contend that "unconscious processes" should not be relied upon as
either legislative authority or litigation evidence in antidiscrimination cases until more valid research is
done), with Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment
Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and DisparateTreatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1035 (2006) (extolling
the value of psychological research, and in particular researchers' discoveries regarding implicit biases,
for solving the problem of defining and identifying discriminatory motivation in Title VII disparate
treatment cases).
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the import of the science, and full consideration of the contemporary
research literature. This Article examines the basic legal framework
established by Title V1 and considers whether, and how, the broad
program of research on implicit bias might fit into this scheme. We focus
primarily on the admissibility of expert opinion, an issue that necessarily
depends on the meaning of the law and the import of social science.
Scientific evidence must be both relevant and reliable.' Although
courts typically treat these requirements separately, they are closely
related in principle. As a preliminary matter, if scientific research is
fundamentally flawed, and thus not reliable or valid for any purpose, it is
inadmissible. Hence, a necessary precondition for admissibility is basic
validity. In many cases, research programs pass muster on this
precondition. The law of evidence, however, demands more. To be
admissible, research must be valid for the purpose for which it is offered.
This is a question of relevance, which in this context is better described
as a matter of "fit." 5 Fit concerns the logical connection between
scientifically valid expert opinion and the issues that must be proven as a
matter of law. Expert opinion relevant for one legal purpose may not be
relevant, or fit, for another.6 For instance, valid research indicating that
eyewitnesses are unreliable when they make cross-racial identifications
might not fit a case that involves a cross-ethnic identification!
Assessments of fit must consider whether the proffered expertise is valid
for purposes made salient by applicable law. Fit, therefore, provides the
bridge between the methodological bases of expert opinion and the
substantive requirements of law.

2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006).

3. Our guide for considering admissibility is Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,
589 0993), since it applies to federal cases brought under Title VII. See infra notes 5-6, 243-46 and
accompanying text for additional discussion of Daubert.
4. FED R. EVID. 702.
5. Daubert,509 U.S. at 591 (citing United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 1985))
(describing the relevance inquiry as a matter of "fit").
6. The Court in Daubert offered this somewhat fanciful example to make the point:
The study of the phases of the moon, for example, may provide valid scientific "knowledge"
about whether a certain night was dark, and if darkness is in fact in issue, the knowledge
will assist the trier of fact. However (absent creditable grounds supporting such a link),
evidence that the moon was full on a certain night will not assist the trier of fact in
determining whether an individual was unusually likely to have behaved irrationally that
night. Rule 702's "helpfulness" standard requires a valid scientific connection to the
pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility.
Id. at 591 ("[S]cientific validity for one purpose is not necessarily scientific validity for other, unrelated
purposes.").
7. See, e.g., State v. Romero, 922 A.2d 693, 700 (N.J. 2007) ("At present, there is insufficient
data to support the conclusion that, as a matter of due process, people of the same race but different
ethnicity, specifically Hispanic ethnicity, require a [special judicial] instruction whenever they are
identified by someone of a different ethnicity.").
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The demand that expert opinion fit the legal issues in dispute
manifests itself in two basic ways. The first concerns what might be
termed "legal fit," and involves whether the expert's opinions relate to
an issue of law presented in the case. The second concerns what might be
termed "scientific fit," and involves whether the research basis for the
expert's opinion can be validly applied to the legal issues in dispute.
Although both are matters of fit, the legal and scientific varieties arise in
different ways.
One example of legal fit comes from Garlinger v. Hardee's Food
Systems, Inc.' The plaintiff brought suit after an employee of the
defendant spilled coffee on him at a drive-through window.9 The plaintiff
argued that the coffee was defectively designed because it was too hot.'0
The plaintiff's expert, a biomechanical engineer, sought to testify that the
risk of thermal burn was greater when the temperature of the coffee was
18o degrees, rather than 15o degrees." The Fourth Circuit found that this
evidence was not relevant to a legal issue present in the case.' 2 The real
issue, which the expert did not address, was whether making cooler
coffee was "even possible, and, if so, whether [the defendant] was
unreasonable for failing to make such a modification."' 3 The court
explained that while "the expert's testimony about the effects of hot
liquid on human skin may have scientific validity in some contexts, it
does not 'fit' this case."' 4 It was simply not a matter that was legally in
dispute, and thus no amount of valid scientific evidence would be
admissible to prove it. A party cannot prove what the law renders
irrelevant.
Scientific fit concerns whether the research basis for an expert
opinion generalizes to the legal issue presented-what social scientists
call external validity.'5 For example, in Metabolife International v.
Wornick, a manufacturer of herbal diet pills brought suit against a
television station and others for defamation, because the defendants
asserted that plaintiff's product was unsafe.'6 In order to prove that its
product was safe, and thus that the televised report was false, the plaintiff
offered an assortment of research, including animal studies.' 7 The
8. 16 F. App'x 232, 236 ( 4 th Cir. 2001).
9. Id. at 234.

io. Id.
ii. Id.
12. Id. at 236.
13. Id.
14. ld.
15. See generally WILLIAM R.

SHADISH ET AL., EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS

FOR GENERALIZED CAUSAL INFERENCE (2001).

16. 264 F.3d 832, 837 (9th Cir. 200).
17. Id. at 842.
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question presented concerned whether animal studies were relevant toi.e., scientifically fit-the legal issue regarding the safety of the product. 8
The majority found that the animal studies fit the issue of the product's
safety and disagreed that the "species gap" necessarily rendered such
work unhelpful to the trier of fact. 9 Judge Rymer wrote separately to
disagree with this conclusion, arguing that "straight extrapolation of
animal data to humans is not appropriate."2
Legal fit presents a traditional problem of legal reasoning in
assessing the substance of the standard that applies in particular cases.
This is usually a problem of interpretation, whether of a statute,
constitution, or common law.2 Indeed, one way of phrasing legal fit is to
assume the validity of the expert opinion and ask whether it is relevant to
the case. If the answer is no, the proffered expertise must be excluded.
Scientific fit, in contrast, calls upon judges to examine the
methodological bases for the proffered expert opinion and consider
whether they have probative value for a legal issue present in the case.
This is a nontraditional problem for lawyers and judges because it
demands a blend of legal and scientific reasoning. Scientific fit requires
judges to have a fairly sophisticated understanding of both science and
the law. For instance, the question of whether animal studies can be
relied upon to conclude similar effects in humans is, at bottom, a
complex scientific judgment. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence,
however, it is one that must be made by judges in their capacity as
gatekeepers.2 And in most cases it is no simple matter.
In most evidentiary contexts, scientific fit is not about a single
research study, or even a set of studies, using a single paradigm.
Researchers studying a particular phenomenon ought to employ a
variety of research protocols, varying subject populations, operational
definitions of the phenomenon under investigation, dependent variables,
and so forth. In the animal study example, toxicological studies using
animals will often be buttressed by epidemiological studies having
varying strengths and weaknesses; together these different types of basic
empirical studies might be buttressed by arguments regarding the
biological plausibility of the phenomenon.23 In the context of
i8. Id. at 841-42.
19. Id.
2o. Id. at 859 (Rymer, J., dissenting).
21. It should be emphasized that scientific knowledge often is an integral part of interpreting
applicable law. The rules of evidence, however, do not apply at the interpretation stage. This subject is
discussed at greater length infra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
22. See FED R. EVID. 702; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (i993)
("[U]nder the [Federal] Rules the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or
evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.").
23. See generally 2 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TEsTIMoNY § 5
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discrimination litigation, therefore, the scientific fit of proffered evidence
must be evaluated in light of the full research literature, and not any
single strand of it. 4 Hence, the scientific fit of an expert's opinion
ordinarily depends on the integration of a large collection of disparate
studies and judgment calls regarding their import.
Not infrequently, a line of research will be found to scientifically fit
one legal issue presented but not another in the same case. The classic
example of this is eyewitness identification research. Many courts find
psychological research on the unreliability of cross-racial identifications
admissible to instruct jurors about factors that might have affected a
particular identification, but none allow this research to support an
25
expert opinion that a particular identification was unreliable. Scientific
fit, therefore, obligates courts to pierce the surface of a research program
in order to determine whether it can be used for all of the purposes for
which it might be offered.
Most areas of expert evidence present issues of legal and scientific
fit, and courts must assess each area of expert evidence on its own merits.
The analysis is fairly straightforward and can be divided into three
essential questions. First, what is the proper interpretation of the law?
Second, does the proffered expertise legally fit one or more issues
brought into question by the law? Third, does the research basis
scientifically fit, in that it is sufficient to support the proffered opinion?
This Article considers these three questions in analyzing whether
research on implicit bias can assist triers of fact in discrimination
litigation under Title VII. Part I examines the first two queries, the
interpretation of applicable law and the legal fit between the law and
scientific research on implicit bias. Part II provides an overview of the
psychological and sociological literatures in order to determine whether
(David L. Faigman et al. eds., 2007-2008 ed.) [hereinafter MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE].
24. In their recent article, Gregory Mitchell and Philip Tetlock make this basic error. See
generally Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note I. They set forth their thesis that recent legal scholarship
"challenges the default psychological assumption in antidiscrimination law that discrimination is a
function of psychological processes under the conscious control of the discriminator, and replaces it
with the assumption that discrimination is the result of unconscious, or implicit, psychological
processes that operate automatically, beyond conscious control." Id. at 1023. Although their thesis is
stated broadly, their actual critique is limited almost exclusively to one line of research that uses one
methodology-the Implicit Association Test (IAT). Id. at 1025. As Part III, infra, makes abundantly
clear, empirical evidence of implicit bias comes from studies using multiple methods and paradigms; it
is not limited to the IAT. Thus, Mitchell and Tetlock's critique of this one method leaves untouched
the rest of the research literature that demonstrates the existence of implicit bias using a variety of
other methodologies. Interestingly, the findings from this broader research base in psychology and
sociology are often very consistent with studies using IATs. See Part II, infra, for a discussion of the
psychological and sociological research underlying the science of implicit bias.
25. See David L. Faigman et al., Eyewitness Identifications, in 2 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE,
supranote 23, at § I6.
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research might support expert opinion in these cases. Part III returns to
the matter of fit and considers whether the extant research scientifically
fits one or more issues brought into question by the law. We conclude
that the full research literature amply supports expert opinion regarding
implicit bias and its potential to effect employment decisions. The
research, however, focuses on the phenomenon generally and does not
demonstrate that an expert can validly determine whether implicit bias
caused a specific employment decision. Courts should therefore admit
expert testimony, insofar as it will assist triers of fact to understand the
phenomenon of implicit bias generally, so that they can then determine
whether a particular employment decision was a product of improper
motives.
I.
A.

THE LAW: INTERPRETATION AND FIT

INTERPRETATION

Title VII makes it an "unlawful employment practice for an
employer.., to discriminate against any individual..., because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."2 6 In a 1991 Act,
Congress clarified this language, providing that "an unlawful
employment practice is established when the complaining party
demonstrates that [a prohibited characteristic] was a motivating factor
for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated
the practice."27 In order to establish an individual discrimination claim
under Title VIi, therefore, a complainant must prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that (i) he or she is a member of a
protected group, (2) he or she suffered as the result of a negative
employment decision, and (3) his or her membership in a protected
group was a motivating factor in that decision."'
For present purposes, the first two criteria are not controversial. The
third criterion, of course, presents the key operative question. How
should the concept that protected group membership was a "motivating
factor" be defined? On its face, if the motivating factor must be a
consciously held belief that is self-reported by the decision maker, then
research on implicit bias is not relevant to, or does not fit, the applicable
law. If, however, implicit beliefs qualify as motivating factors under the
statute, then valid research in this area would squarely fit the legal
standard.

26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(I) (2006) (emphasis added).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 200oe-2(m) (2006); see Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94 (2003) (citing
Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 250-51 (1994)).
28. Desert Palace,Inc., 539 U.S. at ioo.
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Congress, however, did not specifically define what it meant by the
phrase "motivating factors" under Title VII. The notion of "motivating
factors," of course, has two interconnected components, one cognitive
and the other behavioral. One way of understanding motivating factors is
to assume that there is a basic linear relationship between thought and
action. Accordingly, an actionable decision occurs when an employer9
thinks bad (i.e., biased) thoughts and acts pursuant to those thoughts.
This is the conventional view of motivation and behavior: bad thoughts
cause bad behavior. But not all motivations are necessarily fully
conscious. Even common sense experience suggests that there is more to
thinking and behaving than what we specifically intend to do. Anyone
who has driven home on "autopilot" -that is, without being consciously
aware throughout the drive -intuitively understands that behavior can
be caused by implicit thoughts. The statute and the legislative history are
silent as regards the kinds of "thoughts" that qualify as "motivating."
The statute simply does not specify what state of mind qualifies as legally
actionable.
As a general matter, therefore, the term "motivating factors" might
be defined either strictly or broadly. A strict interpretation would
encompass only explicitly contemplated intentions. In order to be liable,
an employer would have had to act pursuant to explicitly biased
thoughts. As shorthand, this could be called the "explicit bias rule." A
broad interpretation, on the other hand, would also encompass thought
processes that led to objectionable behavior. As shorthand, this could be
called the "explicit or implicit bias rule."
Under the explicit bias rule, an employer would not be liable if he or
she was "honest" in saying that bias was not a motivating factor.
Plaintiffs, therefore, would be obligated to prove that the basis the
employer gave for the negative employment decision "was a lie or had no
basis in fact."3 Hence, if an employer honestly believed that the
motivating factor for the negative employment decision was
3
nondiscriminatory, he or she would not be liable under the law. '
Therefore, it would make no difference if, in fact, the motivating factor

29. Cf 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-2(m).
30. Crim v. Bd. of Educ., 147 F.3d 535, 541 (7th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); see Krieger &
Fiske, supra note i, at 1037. See generally Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories:A
Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV.
1161, 1178-81 (1995).
31. See Krieger & Fiske, supra note I, at 1038 ("[T]he logic of the honest belief rule decisions
points to the operation of an unstated and unexamined judicial theory about the nature of
discriminatory motivation itself-that when people discriminate they know that they are doing so. The
honest belief rule assumes that a reason proffered by an employer to explain its action is either... an
'honest answer' or a deliberate lie.").
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was an implicit prejudice that the employer had little or no knowledge of.
Under the explicit bias rule, implicit biases are irrelevant.
But conscious intentionality is not the only way to conceive of
motivating factors. It is hardly sacrosanct in the law that people are held
accountable only for what they consciously intended to do and actually
did; civil liability is regularly premised on what people should have
anticipated before acting but did not. If people do not have full cognitive
access to what motivates their behavior, an employer may honestly
believe that nondiscriminatory reasons led him or her to impose a
negative outcome on the plaintiff, but be wrong about those reasons. An
employer could have acted in good faith, yet still have been motivated by
bias or prohibited stereotypes. If implicit biases motivate behavior, the
law might reasonably place a duty on employers to take reasonable
measures to ensure against them. Hence, under an explicit or implicit
bias rule, implicit biases are relevant.
Whether implicit motives-or an employer's failure to counteract
them-should be actionable is, of course, separate from the
psychological matter of how people think and what causes them to
behave. However, it is imperative to understand how people think in
order to establish the basic scope of Title VII. If the phenomenon of
implicit bias is chimerical, then the explicit bias rule seems
uncontroversial. Only consciously formed motivations would be relevant
to determining whether a negative employment decision was
discriminatory. If implicit biases do motivate behavior, however, then the
law might seek to regulate their influence under a law that specifically
proscribes all "motivating factors." Hence, the first question to consider
is what motivates behavior.
At this point in the discussion, it is important to emphasize that
information about how people think is pertinent to interpreting the law
itself; we are not yet in the realm of applying the law. Evidentiary
standards are quite different in the separate domains of interpretation
and application. The factual issues of human cognition, in this context,
operate as "legislative facts" and must be found by judges as such,
because they are an integral component in judicial interpretation of the
law.' Although it generally behooves judges still to employ good science
in deciding legislative fact questions, it is not their only obligation in
carrying out this task. Specifically, the first responsibility in interpreting a
32. See Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process,

55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402-03 (1942) (explaining that legislative facts are those facts that transcend the
particular dispute and have relevance to legal reasoning and the fashioning of legal rules). In the
lexicon of Professors Laurens Walker and John Monahan, such facts are the product of "social
authority" and are resolved by judges and become subjects of precedent. See Laurens Walker & John
Monahan, Social Frameworks:A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559, 585 (1987).
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statute is to determine what the legislature intended by the words it
chose. 3 If Congress had only a primitive understanding of human
cognition, it would not be the courts' job to modernize that
understanding based on current scientific knowledge. If Congress,
however, intended to enlist contemporary understanding of cognition to
inform the law's meaning, or was merely silent on the subject, then courts
are obliged to give the statute's words a reasonable interpretation in light
of the best knowledge available.34
Congress was largely silent on the question of what constitutes
motivating factors, thus leaving a void that the courts need to fill.3 Given
the language Congress did employ, some conception of human cognition
must inform the meaning of the statute?6 Since the law speaks in terms of
motivating factors, it is incumbent on courts to employ some theory of
human thought processes. The explicit bias rule does this, in that it
presumes that as conscious actors people have access to the reasons
behind their actions. Indeed, this seems intuitive. Most people believe
that they largely have access to the cognitive processes that lie behind
their actions.37 Yet, as some of the research surveyed in Part II indicates,
our intuitions appear to be quite wrong. It turns out that our access to
the true motivating bases for our behavior is imperfect and, more
troubling for Title VII law, misleading.
Seemingly inconsistent with defining "motivating factors" as
permitting proof of implicit bias are the Supreme Court's repeated38
statements that Title VII proscribes only "intentional discrimination.

33. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 22-23

(997); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory Interpretation,
66 U. CHI.L. REV. 671, 671-72 (1999).

34. See Eskridge, supra note 33, at 672.
35. In matters of statutory interpretation the question concerns what was intended by the
enacting legislature. Congress in this case failed to say specifically whether motivating factors were
limited to those consciously intended. Krieger and Fiske consider this question and employ the longaccepted technique of surveying common usage in modern dictionaries. They make the following
argument:
The Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language, Unabridged
defines the word "motive" as "something within a person (as need, idea, organic state, or
emotion) that incites him to action." In other words, a "motivating factor" is an internal
mental state, a category that includes cognitive structures like implicit stereotypes or other
social schema that influence social perception, judgment, and action. For race, color, sex,
national origin, or other protected characteristics to "motivate" an employment decision
means that the characteristic served as a stimulus which, interacting with the decision
maker's internal biased mental state, led the decision maker to behave toward the person
differently than he otherwise would.
Krieger & Fiske, supra note I,at 1056 (citations and footnote omitted).
36. Cf.42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(b) (2006).
37. TIMOTHY D. WILSON, STRANGERS TO OURSELVES: DISCOVERING THE ADAPTIVE UNCONSCIOUS 4-5
(2002).

38. See, e.g., Reeves v. Sanderson, 530 U.S. 133, 141 (2000).
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However, the belief that implicit bias research is irrelevant to the legal
issue of "intentional" discrimination badly conflates the evidentiary
question of relevance with the ultimate question of liability. As the
Court's cases make plain, in Title VII cases "[t]he ultimate question is
whether the employer intentionally discriminated."39 This issue may be
proved, however, by both direct and circumstantial evidence. It is of
course an elementary principle of evidence law that every piece of
evidence need not win the case. "A brick is not a wall."' The question of
whether a defendant "intentionally discriminated" in a particular case
must be determined by an assessment of the totality of the
circumstances." No smoking gun is required.
Indeed, the Court has consistently taken a broad brush approach to
the issue of "intentionality" in Title VII cases. For example, in Reeves v.
Sanderson, the Court applied the McDonnell Douglas framework,42
which pertains to cases in which the plaintiff relies on circumstantial
evidence.43 Under this framework, the plaintiff has the initial burden to
prove a prima facie case of discrimination." If the plaintiff succeeds, the
burden of production shifts to the defendant, who must provide a
legitimate reason for his or her actions.45 If the defendant provides a
nondiscriminatory reason, the plaintiff then must either show that an
illegal consideration was a determinative factor in the employment
decision or that the defendant's explanation for its action was merely
pretext. 46 The Court in Reeves stated unambiguously that in proving the
ultimate question -intentional discrimination -triers of fact could
reasonably infer this conclusion from indirect proof.47 For instance, the
Reeves Court itself found that "[p]roof that the defendant's explanation
is unworthy of credence... may be quite persuasive.""4 Like the silent
dog in The Hound of the Baskervilles, even absence of proof can be
powerful evidence.49
39. Id. at 146 (emphasis added).
40. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185, 278 (John Strong ed., 5 th ed. 1999) ("Whether the entire
body of one party's evidence is sufficient to go to the jury is one question. Whether a particular item of
evidence is relevant to the case is quite another.").
41. The Anderson Group, LLC v. City of Saratoga Springs, No. 1:o5-CV-I369 (GLS/DRH), 2008
WL 819755, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2008).
42. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142.
43. McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 ('973).
44. Id. at 802-05.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147.
48. Id. The Court summarized as follows: "[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with
sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact
to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated." Id. at 148.
49. ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, THE HOUND OF THE BASKERVILLES: ANOTHER ADVENTURE OF SHERLOCK
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In considering the totality of the circumstances, proof of implicit bias
potentially provides considerable information to the trier of fact in at
least two respects. Foremost, it can assist fact finders to understand the
complex realities of cognition and behavior that underlie legal5 notions
such as "motivating factors" and "intentional discrimination." In the
simplest of cases, human motivations are complex and enigmatic. Fact
finders can use all of the help they can get. Second, evidence of implicit
bias can help establish the context for evaluating the facts of the
respective case. 5' Comments or actions that might otherwise be
ambiguous or seem tangential to the dispute might take on greater
meaning or more resonance in light of this proof.
Moreover, there may be a more direct role for evidence of implicit
bias in Title VII cases. Although the Court employs the term
"intentional" in its doctrinal expansion of the statute's actual words,
"motivating factors," it has never held that only consciously held and
explicit motives qualify under the applicable law.52 Especially in light of
the science, such a construction seems particularly crabbed and artificial.
As noted earlier, anyone who has driven home on "autopilot" intuitively
understands that behavior can be "intended" implicitly. If the driver on
autopilot killed a pedestrian, the question whether he "intended" to do
so is complicated. He certainly "intended" to drive through the
intersection notwithstanding any objects in his way. As a criminal matter,
he might not have had the specific intent to kill, but his implicit intentor his failure to avoid killing someone as he specifically (albeit implicitly)
intended to drive through the intersection-might still be subject to
prosecution. Even as employed in the law, intent and motivating factors
are multifarious concepts. Under Title VII, it is entirely consistent to
consider implicit motivations as one component, and possibly a key
component, in determining whether a defendant "intentionally
discriminated." 3 Intentional is simply not coterminous with explicit, and
the Court's cases make plain that the conclusion of "intentionality" can
be informed by a wide range of circumstances. 4
In addition to the underlying presumptions of human cognition, the
explicit bias rule is guided by a legal theory of questionable provenance.
It presumes that only when people have consciously made decisions
motivated by bias should they be liable under the law. The driving theory
HOLMES (932).

See discussion of Title VII, supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
51. See, e.g., Brian A. Nosek et al., Harvesting Implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs from a
50.

Demonstration Web Site, 6 GROUP DYNAM. THEORY, RES. & PRAC. 10,
52. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at i4o, 142.

53. See, e.g., Kreiger & Fiske, supra note i, at 1004.
54. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 141-48.

io6, 1I1 (2002).
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is thus actually twofold, one psychological and the other legal: first,
people ordinarily have access to their motivating factors; and second,
only when they have consciously acted pursuant to illicit motives should
they be held accountable. 5 As discussed above and further developed in
Part II, the explicit bias rule does not conform to what is generally
known about human decision making.6 However, even if people are
sometimes motivated by unconscious beliefs, is it reasonable to hold
them liable for such beliefs? The law might very well enact a high
threshold of proof, one that makes discrimination actionable only when
it is a product of specific intent. Under this interpretation, bias must be
consciously formed.
If Title VII extends to implicit motivations, another issue arises
concerning how this might be handled as a practical matter. After all, if
large numbers of people are infused with implicit biases, use of this
evidence would appear to open the floodgates to litigation. But there is
little reason to fear this outcome. The subject of mental states is an old
one in the law and the edifice continues to stand. For instance, courts and
legislatures regularly distinguish between honest beliefs and reasonable
beliefs.57 In self-defense cases, for example, the law requires people who
use deadly force to believe, among other things, that they confront
imminent harm of "death or serious bodily injury."" Jurisdictions
disagree, however, whether this belief should be measured on the basis
of the defendant's subjective honest belief, or what an objectively
reasonable person would have believed under similar circumstances. 9
The subjective test focuses on the circumstances of the individual and
inquires merely whether the person honestly believed that deadly force
55. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
56. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text; infra notes 240-41 and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 198 (West 2008) (distinguishing between an individual's honest
belief and a reasonable belief in stating that an individual's beliefs must not only be actually or
honestly held, but also be reasonably held in order for an individual's actions to meet the threshold of
excusable self-defense).
A bare fear of the commission of any of the offenses mentioned in subdivisions 2 and 3 of
Section 197, to prevent which homicide may be lawfully committed, is not sufficient to
justify it. But the circumstances must be sufficient to excite the fears of a reasonable person,
and the party killing must have acted under the influence of such fears alone.
Id.
58. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(a)(ii) (20o7).
59. See, e.g., People v. Trevino, 246 Cal. Rptr. 357, 359 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that it is wellsettled law that exculpation by self-defense requires "'an honest and reasonable belief in the need to
defend"' (citations omitted)); Linsley v. State, sO So. 273, 275 (Fla. 1924) (noting that to claim selfdefense "circumstances must be such as to induce a reasonably cautious and prudent man to believe
that the danger was actual and the necessity was real"); Sate v. Low, No. 20050807, 2oo8 WL 2572880,
*8 (Utah 2008) (noting that the distinction between perfect and imperfect self-defense is whether or
not the defendant possessed an honest and reasonable belief or just an honest belief that force was
necessary).
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was necessary." It does not matter that the person was wrong, or even
that a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have believed
otherwise. Objective tests, in comparison, go beyond the individual
person's beliefs about the event, and ask whether that person acted
reasonably under the circumstances."
In effect, the explicit bias rule is akin to employing the subjective
honesty test. If defendants honestly believed that their decisions were
motivated by legitimate grounds for taking the negative action
complained of, they would not be liable. As a policy matter, this test
operates to the benefit of defendants (civil and criminal), since they are
excused for their conduct, even though they might have acted in an
objectively unreasonable fashion, so long as they acted honestly. In many
legal contexts, however, this subjective approach is disfavored.2 It does
not create incentives for people63 to adjust their behavior to a reasonable
baseline of acceptable conduct.
The classic objective reasonable person test could be used to
determine whether the plaintiff's protected group status was a motivating
factor in the negative employment decision. This standard would not
open the floodgates to litigation or permit specious forms of proof.
Indeed, the parties would essentially litigate cases in the same way as
they do now. However, the trier of fact would consider the negative
employment decision in a broader light, and evaluate the employer's
60. See, e.g., State v. Melchior, 381 N.E.2d 195, I99 (Ohio 1978) (describing the elements of
Ohio's subjective self-defense test as: "To establish self-defense, the following elements must be
shown: (s) the slayer was not at fault in creating the situation giving rise to the affray, (2) the slayer
has a bona fide belief that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that his only
means of escape from such danger was in the use of such force, and (3) the slayer must not have
violated any duty to retreat or avoid the danger." (citations omitted)).
61. See, e.g., State v. Bult, 989 S.W.2d 730, 732 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) (explaining that selfdefense "not only entail[s] what a defendant actually believes, but ... as well, what is a reasonable
belief under the circumstances. This means that the defendant's conduct and mental state must meet
an objective standard of reasonableness for the conduct to be justified under these statutory
defenses.").
62. See, e.g., Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 487-88 (1986) (rejecting a subjective test for
determining "cause" for procedural default in federal habeas corpus cases); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468
U.S. 420, 442 n.35 (984) (explaining, in the context of determining custody for possible Fifth
Amendment Miranda violations, why "an objective, reasonable-man test is appropriate because,
unlike a subjective test, it 'is not solely dependent either on the self-serving declarations of the police
officers or the defendant nor does it place upon the police the burden of anticipating the frailties or
idiosyncracies of every person whom they question' (citing People v. P., 233 N.E.2d 225, 260 (N.Y.
1967))); United States v. Pen-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 174 (1964) (explaining why subjective tests
are inappropriate for determining potential competition in antitrust actions).
63. See, e.g., United States v. Piva, 870 F.2d 753, 757 (ist Cir. 1989) (noting that an objective test
is more appropriate than a subjective test for evaluating the defense of withdrawal for conspiracy
charges: "[a]n objective test is the more appropriate one since it would fit the rationale for the asserted
defense of withdrawal, which is to create an incentive for persons either to report and prevent the
commission of a crime or to refrain from actually participating in it").
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explanation of his or her motivation against the background of the
phenomenon that people very often act according to preconceptions and
biases. Where implicit biases operate unfettered by institutional
safeguards, defendants under Title VII might similarly be held
accountable.
B.

LEGAL FIT

If a reasonable person test is the proper interpretation of Title VII,
general scientific evidence of implicit bias might very well assist the trier
of fact in determining whether such bias was a motivating factor in a
particular case. For purposes of discussing legal fit, we can assume the
basic validity of the science, and ask simply whether it prima facie is
relevant to the applicable law. In considering this question, the science
has to be evaluated in two separate, albeit related, respects.
Science and law approach empirical issues very differently. As one
of the Authors has observed: "While science attempts to discover the
universals hiding among the particulars, trial courts attempt to discover
the particulars hiding among the universals."" This division between the
general and the specific corresponds to the two essential ways scientific
research might legally fit in a case.
Consider the example of the reliability of cross-racial eyewitness
identifications. Scientific research on this subject generally tests the
straightforward hypothesis that such identifications are less reliable than
same race identifications and indicates fairly clearly that, on average,
people find identifying those of a different race to be a more difficult
task than identifying someone from the same race.6s The ultimate legal
question, however, is whether a particular identification was correct. Is
evidence of the general phenomenon relevant to a fact finder's
determination of the specific question? Virtually all courts agree that it
is, since it provides contextual information that might help fact finders
determine the accuracy of the identification. Obviously, not all crossracial identifications are inaccurate, but the data gives fact finders
information they can combine with other evidence in order to decide the
specific question whether a particular eyewitness identification was
correct.

64. DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN THE LAW 69 (i999).
65. See Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identifications: Scientific Status, in MODERN SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE, supra note 23, at § 16:30. Still, many courts do not routinely admit eyewitness identification
expert testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 41o F.3 d 942, 950 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing United
States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1104-05 ( 7th Cir. 1999)). Their objection, however, is not to the
relevance of the science. Id. Courts that do not admit such evidence rely primarily on the ground that
jurors already understand the dangers of eyewitness identification. Id.
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In other contexts, experts seek to testify not only to a general
phenomenon established by empirical evidence, but also to whether a
particular case is an instance of that phenomenon. Consider, for
example, a tort case in which the plaintiff claims that her lung cancer is
attributable to secondhand smoke. The plaintiff must first introduce
evidence demonstrating the general relationship between secondhand
smoke and lung cancer. Like eyewitness identification, this proof will
ultimately have to be judged on its merits. Since testing such general
propositions is the ordinary business of science, this is a fairly
straightforward task. However, the plaintiff will also seek to introduce
testimony that secondhand smoke was the cause of her lung cancer. This
task is not a routine aspect of scientific investigation, and thus presents
considerable challenges to both the experts and the courts.' In the
secondhand smoke example, while scientific research might demonstrate
that exposure to smoke increases the likelihood of developing lung
cancer, most cases of lung cancer are not attributable to that cause. Just
as skiing might lead to an increased risk of a broken leg, all broken legs
cannot be attributed to skiing. In many contexts, while science can
identify factors that increase the likelihood of injury, it provides little
assistance in identifying which injuries were caused by those factors. Yet,
despite the limitations inherent in the science, courts are obligated to
make case specific determinations. Whether expert testimony should be
admitted to assist this obligation depends on the validity of the methods
and principles employed in the respective case. 67 If an expert can
demonstrate the validity of both the general science (i.e., factor X causes
or is associated with condition Y in populations) and specific applications
of that science (i.e., a valid methodology permits an expert to determine
when a specific instance of condition Y was caused by factor X), then the
expert (or experts) should be allowed to testify to both . 6 However, if the
state of the art of the science only permits expert opinion regarding the
general science, it should be so limited. 6
Proof regarding implicit bias is like all other expert evidence in that
it might be admitted to assist fact finders generally, or both generally and
specifically. As a prima facie matter, the research has the potential to
operate at both levels, if the science can bear it out. As Part II indicates,
research on implicit bias parallels that of eyewitness identification, in
66. See David L. Faigman, The Limits of Science in the Courtroom, in

BEYOND COMMON SENSE:

PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 306-07 (Eugene Borgida & Susan T. Fiske eds., 2007).
67. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 0993).
68. See generally, I MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 23, at § 1.18.
69. It should perhaps go without saying that if there is no general proof of an association between

factor X and condition Y, there can be no valid specific proof that factor X caused condition Y in a
particular case. Id.
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that it largely makes no claim to individualized assessments.' In Part III
we return to consider the import of the research in order to determine
whether, and how, it scientifically fits the applicable law.
II. THE PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY OF IMPLICIT BIAS
The commonsense understanding of human motivation is that in
order to discover the motivating factors driving an individual's decisions
and actions one simply has to ask him or her. This understanding rests on
the assumption that (a) people have accurate introspective access to their
motivations, cognitions, and behaviors; and (b) they are typically willing
to report them honestly.7 As we will demonstrate below, social
psychological research over the past fifty years has found that both of
these assumptions are deeply flawed.
A.

THE FALSE ASSUMPTION ABOUT THE ACCURACY OF SELF-REPORTS

One of the most important discoveries in empirical social psychology
in the twentieth century is that people's perceptions and behavior are
often shaped by factors that lie outside their awareness and cannot be
fully understood by intuitive methods such as self-reflection.72 In a highly
influential article entitled Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal
Reports on Mental Processes, Nisbett and Wilson articulated two stages
in the decision-making process where individuals' ability to explain their
own motivations and cognitions is surprisingly limited.73 First, people are
often unaware of the effect particular stimuli have on their own higherorder inferential judgments.74 That is, they cannot identify what variables
systematically caused their judgment.75 This may happen because the
actual causal variable seems innocuous and irrelevant to the judgment, or
because it is separated in time from the judgment. 6 Applying this idea to
the context of employment decisions, decision makers may be unaware
See discussion infra Part II.
71. See WILSON, supra note 37.
72. Joyce Ehrlinger et al., Peering Into the Bias Blind Spot: People's Assessments of Bias in
Themselves and Others, 31 PERS'LTY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 68o, 68i (2005); Anthony Greenwald &
Mahzarin R. Banaji, Added, Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-esteem, and Stereotypes, io2
PSYCHOL. REV. 4,4 0995).
73. Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy D. Wilson, Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports
on Mental Processes,84 PSYCHOL. REv. 234, 242-43 (1977).
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., Leon Festinger & James M. Carlsmith, Cognitive Consequences of Forced
Compliance, 58 J. AB. & Soc. PSYCHOL. 203, 203-04 (i959); George. R. Goethals, & R.F. Reckman, The
Perceptionof Consistency in Attitudes, 9 J. EXPMT'L Soc. PsYcHoL. 491 (1973); Bibb Latane & John M.
Darley, Group Inhibition of Bystander Intervention in Emergencies, 1o J. PERS'LTY & Soc. PSYCHOL.
215, 217 (1968); Richard E. Nisbett & Stanley Schachter, The Cognitive Manipulation of Pain, 2 J.
EXPMT'L Soc. PSYCHOL. 227 (1966); Stuart Valins & Alice A. Ray, Effects of Cognitive Desensitization
on Avoidance Behavior, 7 J. PERS'LTY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 345, 345 (1967).
76. Nisbett & Wilson, supra note 73, at 236-37.
70.
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that the sex of a job applicant or her pregnancy status (the causal
variables) influenced their judgments of the applicant's competence and
fit for the job (the effect) because these variables seemed innocuous and
unrelated to the decision at hand.
Second, when asked to report on what motivated their judgment,
decision makers cannot easily backtrack and reconstruct the exact
thought process that led from the stimulus (e.g., encountering the job
candidate) to the judgment (e.g., should we hire her?).77 Instead, they
base their explanation on a priori naYve causal theories about the likely
causal connection between stimulus and response, which may be
erroneous."s Thus, self-generated explanations of one's own thought
process are often no more accurate than that of outside observers who
have little knowledge of the mental content of another person. In an
interesting study illustrating this phenomenon, Nisbett and Bellows
asked participants to evaluate a job candidate after reading a fake
application portfolio, in which several of the job candidate's
characteristics were experimentally manipulated (e.g., her physical
appearance, academic credentials, etc.).79 Participants were then asked to
report the extent to which each of these characteristics was a motivating
factor in their evaluations of the candidate. 8" Another group of "observer
participants" who had access to an abbreviated application portfolio
were asked to predict how the same characteristics would influence other
people's judgments." Results showed that participants' self-reports about
the effects of the manipulated characteristics on their own judgments
were remarkably inaccurate, and no different from the predictions of
observers who had impoverished information.2 These data raise doubts
about people's introspective access to their own cognitive process and
their ability to report on it accurately. In the context of Title VII cases,
these data imply that if asked to explain the motivating factors that drove
their evaluations of a particular job candidate, decision makers may not
be able to faithfully reconstruct their process of thinking; instead they
may answer the question by relying on heuristics about what factors
typically motivate hiring decisions. A job candidate's sex or pregnancy
status may be unmentioned as motivating factors because these
characteristics are absent from the decision maker's own theory of
77. Id. at 242-43.
78. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, 8o PSYCHOL.
REV. 237, 237 (i973); Richard E. Nisbett & Nancy Bellows, Verbal Reports About CausalInfluences on
Social Judgments: Private Access Versus Public Theories, 35 J. PEaS'LTY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 613, 613-14
('977)
79. Nisbett & Bellows, supra note 78, at 617.
80. Id. at 618.
8i. Id.
82. Id. at 618-20.
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decision making and the decision maker is therefore unaware of being
influenced by it.
B.

AssuMPTION ABOUT THE HONESTY OF SELF-REPORTS
A second characteristic of the commonsense understanding of
human motivation is that people are typically willing to report the
reasons guiding their thoughts and actions honestly. However, numerous
empirical studies have debunked this assumption, especially when it
comes to socially sensitive topics where there are clear social norms
about "correct" responses (social desirability bias) or when the topic
motivates participants to present their attitudes, motivations, and actions
in the best possible light, consistent with their conscious values (selfpresentation bias)." In a now classic study, participants were asked to
report their beliefs about African Americans under one of two
conditions.8 4 In the control condition they responded to a typical survey
questionnaire. In the experimental condition they responded to the
same questionnaire while hooked up to a "bogus pipeline" which was
described as a physiological instrument that gave the experimenter
access to participants' "true" beliefs."' Results revealed that participants
reported more favorable attitudes toward African Americans when they
thought the experimenter could detect their "true" thoughts compared to
the control condition where they thought the experimenter had no access
to their true thoughts, suggesting that the former self-reports were
contaminated by social desirability. 7
Doubts about the accuracy of self-reflection and the honesty of selfreports prompted social psychologists to seek alternative means of
identifying motivating factors that influence people's attitudes, beliefs,
and behaviors. To that end, carefully controlled studies tested the root
THE FALSE

83. Faye Crosby et al., Recent Unobtrusive Studies of Black and White Discrimination and
Prejudice: A Literature Review, 87 PSYCHOL. BULL. 546, 546-47 (i980); Devah Pager & Lincoln
Quillian, Walking the Talk? What Employers Say Versus What They Do, 70 Am. Soc. REv. 355, 355
(2005); Harold Sigall & Richard Page, Current Stereotypes: A Little Fading, a Little Faking, i8 J.
PERS'LTY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 247, 247-48 (I97I) [hereinafter Sigall & Page, Current Stereotypes]; Harold
Sigall & Richard Page, Reducing Attenuation in the Expression of Interpersonal Affect via the Bogus
Pipeline, 35 SOCIOMETRY 629, 629-30 (1972); Richard Tourageau & Ting Yan, Sensitive Questions in
Surveys, 133 PSYCHOL. BULL. 859,859 (2007).
84. Sigall & Page, CurrentStereotypes, supra note 83, at 248.
85. See id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 254; see also Jason A. Nier, How DissociatedAre Implicit and Explicit Racial Attitudes?
A Bogus PipelineApproach, 8 GROUP PROC'S & INTERGROUP REL. 39 (2005); E. Ashby Plant et al., The
Bogus Pipeline and Motivations to Respond Without Prejudice: Revisiting the Fading and Faking of
Racial Prejudice,6 GROUP PROC'S &INTERGROUP REL. 187, 188 (2003); Vincent Y. Yzerbyt et al., Social
Judgeability and the Bogus Pipeline: The Role of Naive Theories of Judgment in Impression Formation,
15 Soc. COG. 56, 57 (998).
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cause of people's judgments and behaviors by creating situations where
all potential causal factors were held constant except for the one
hypothesized factor which was allowed to vary systematically (e.g., the
sex of the individual being evaluated)." These studies employed a variety
of measures to detect the presence of implicit bias in evaluations of
individuals based on his or her sex or race. As a result, the overall
findings did not depend on the validity of a single measure of implicit
bias. The next Part reviews some of the studies most relevant to
employment discrimination cases based on gender and caregiver status.
In some of these studies participants were likely to be unaware that the
gender or caregiver status of the individual being appraised was
systematically biasing their judgments while in other studies they may
have been quite aware of their bias.
C.

RESEARCH EVIDENCE ON GENDER STEREOTYPES AND DISCRIMINATION

Gender Stereotypes: Women are Communal and Men
are Agentic
The most popular theoretical explanation of the origin of gender
stereotypes comes from Eagly's social-role theory, 8" and Eagly and
Karau's role incongruity theory," which focus on social roles as the
initiators of gender stereotypes: "social roles are socially shared
expectations [about people] who occupy a certain social position or are
members of a particular social category, [while] gender roles are
consensual beliefs about the attributes of women and men."9' These
consensual beliefs include both
descriptive norms, which are consensual expectations about what
members of a group actually do, and injunctive norms, which are
consensual expectations about what a group of people ought to do or
ideally would do.... The term gender role thus refers to the collection
of both descriptive and injunctive expectations associated with women
and men.
According to social role theory, perceivers infer that there is a
correspondence between the types of actions people engage in and
their inner dispositions. '
i.

88. See, e.g., Meredith Pugh & Ralph Wahrman, Neutralizing Sexism in Mixed Sex Groups: Do
Women Have to be Better Than Men?, 88 AM. J. Soc. 746 (1983).
89. ALICE H.

EAGLY, SEX DIFFERENCES IN SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: A SOCIAL-ROLE INTERPRETATION 3

(1987).
90.

Alice H. Eagly & Steven J. Karau, Role Congruity Theory of Prejudice Toward Female

Leaders, 109 PSYCHOL. REV. 573, 576 (2002).
91. Id. at 574 (citations and footnotes omitted).

92. Id. (footnotes omitted); see also EAGLY, supra note 89 ,at i2o; Alice. H. Eagly et al., Social
Role Theory of Sex Differences and Similarities: A Current Appraisal, in THE DEVELOPMENTAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF GENDER 123-74 (Thomas Eckes ed., 2000).
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There is substantial evidence for both descriptive and injunctive
gender stereotypes. With regard to descriptive gender stereotypes, using
American and international samples of adults, students, and children
from thirty countries, numerous studies have found that men are
typically judged as more agentic, or achievement oriented, than women,
whereas women are typically judged as more communal, or
interpersonally oriented than men. 3 Stereotypes of men as more agentic
and women as more communal contain not only a horizontal dimension
of difference between the sexes but also a vertical dimension of status
inequality between men and women.94 Masculine traits are seen as having
higher status than feminine traits.95 Furthermore, these status disparities
are associated with differences in presumed competence. 6 Men are
generally seen as more competent at the "things that count most" and
more worthy of high status roles than are women, even though each sex
is thought to have its specialized set of skills.97 Stereotypic assumptions
about status and competence differences between men and women can
be especially consequential in employment settings.
These gender stereotypes are common knowledge in the United
States, in that almost everyone is aware of these beliefs, and people
presume that most others hold them." In addition to knowing these

E. WILLIAMS & DEBORAH L. BEST, MEASURING SEX STEREOTYPES: A MULTINATION STUDY
Kay Deaux & Marianne LaFrance, Gender, in THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 789
(Daniel Gilbert et al., 4th ed. 1998); Amanda B. Diekman & Alice H. Eagly, Stereotypes as Dynamic
Constructs:Women and Men in the Past, Present,and Future,26 PERS'LTY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1171,
1172 (2000); Alice H. Eagly & Valerie J. Steffen, Gender Stereotypes Stem from the Distributionof
Women and Men into Social Roles, 46 J. PERS'LTY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 735, 736 (1984); Diane N. Ruble &
Carol L. Martin, Gender Development, in THE HANDBOOK OF CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 933 (William Damon
et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998); John E. Williams et al., PanculturalGender Stereotypes Revisited: The Five
FactorModel, 40 SEX ROLES 513,515 (1999).
94. Michael Conway et al., Status, Communality, and Agency: Implications for Stereotypes of
93.

JOHN

22 (199o);

Gender and Other Groups, 71 J. PERS'LTY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 25, 25 (1996); David G. Wagner & Joseph
Berger, Gender and Interpersonal Task Behaviors: Status Expectation Accounts, 40 Soc. PERSP. I, 3-4

('997).
95. Peter Glick et al., Bad but Bold: Ambivalent Attitudes Toward Men PredictGender Inequality
in 16 Nations, 86 J. PERS'LTY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 713,715 (2004).
96. Susan T. Fiske et al., A Model of (Often Mixed) Stereotype Content: Competence and Warmth
Respectively Follow from Perceived Status and Competition, 82 J. PERS'LTY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 878, 88o

(2002); Wagner & Berger, supra note 94, at 8.
97. See Peter Glick & Susan T. Fiske, Sexism and Other "Isms": Interdependence, Status, and the
Ambivalent Content of Stereotypes, in SEXISM AND STEREOTYPES IN MODERN SOCIETY 193, 198 (William

B. Swann, Jr. et al. eds., 1999); Lynne M. Jackson et al., Contemporary Sexism and Discrimination:The
Importance of Respect for Men and Women, 27 PERS'LTY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 48, 54 (2001); Lisa
Slattery Rashotte & Murray Webster, Jr., Gender Status Beliefs, 34 Soc. Sc. RES. 618, 63o-31 (2005);
Wagner & Berger, supra note 94, at 10-14.
98. See Alice H. Eagly et al., Social Role Theory of Sex Differences and Similarities:A Current
Appraisal, in THE DEVELOPMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF GENDER 123, 132-36 (Thomas Eckes &

Hanns M. Trautner eds., 2000); Diekman & Eagly. supra note 93 at 1183-84.
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when
cultural stereotypes, people sometimes explicitly endorse them
99 At other
general.
in
men
to
compared
as
general
in
describing women
times, they eschew gender stereotypes explicitly in favor of egalitarian
beliefs; however, stereotypes continue to emerge subtly when implicit
beliefs are measured indirectly.'"
Studies using a variety of response latency tasks to measure implicit
gender stereotypes indicate that both men and women associate agentic
traits (e.g., ambitious, competent) and professional roles (e.g., doctor,
leader) more quickly and automatically after seeing men compared to
after seeing women; conversely they identify communal traits (e.g.,
nurturing, supportive) and roles (e.g., parent, nurse) more quickly and
automatically after seeing women compared to after seeing men.' One
measure that has shown these effects is the well known Implicit
Association Test (IAT). °2 Importantly, the same findings have been
obtained using other response latency tasks as well, such as semantic
priming tasks and lexical decision tasks." In all of these response latency
studies, faster responses to a social group (e.g., women, men) and
particular traits or roles (e.g., parent, professional) have been interpreted
to mean that those types of traits and roles are preferentially and

99. See Eagly et al., supra note 98, at 123, 132-36; Diekman & Eagly, supra note 93, at 1183-84.
ioO. See Mahzarin R. Banaji & Curtis D. Hardin, Automatic Stereotyping, 7 PSYCHOL. ScI. 136,
137-38 (1996); Mahzarin R. Banaji & Anthony G. Greenwald, Implicit Gender Stereotyping in
Judgments of Fame, 68 J. PERS'LTY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181, 181 (1995); Mahzarin R. Banaji et al., Implicit
Stereotyping in Person Judgment, 65 J. PERS'LTY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 272, 272-73 (1993); Irene V. Blair &
Mahzarin R. Banaji, Automatic and Controlled Processes in Stereotype Priming, 70 PERS'LTY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 1142, 1142 (1996); Nilanjana Dasgupta & Shaki Asgari, Seeing is Believing: Exposure to
Counterstereotypic Women Leaders and its Effect on Automatic Gender Stereotyping, 40 J. ExPMT'L
Soc. PSYCHOL. 642, 643-44 (2004); Kerry Kawakami & John F. Dovidio, The Reliability of Implicit
Stereotyping, 27 PERS'LTY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.

212, 212-13 (2001);

Gordon B. Moskowitz et al.,

Preconscious Control of Stereotype Activation Through Chronic EgalitarianGoals, 77 J. PERS'LTY &
Soc. PSYCHOL. 167, 167 (I999); Nosek et al., supra note 51, at 1Ol-O2; Laurie A. Rudman et al., Implicit
Self-Concept and Evaluative Implicit Gender Stereotypes: Self and Ingroup Share Desirable Traits, 27
PERS'LTY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1164, 1164-65 (2001); Laurie A. Rudman & Peter Glick, Prescriptive
Gender Stereotypes and Backlash Toward Agentic Women, 57 J. Soc. IssuEs 743, 744 (2001).
Ioi. See Blair & Banaji, supra note IOO, at 1147; Irene V. Blair et al., Imagining Stereotypes Away:
The Moderation of Implicit Stereotypes Through Mental Imagery, 81 J. PERS'LTY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 828,
837-38 (2001); Dasgupta & Asgari, supra note Ioo, at 654-55; Kawakami & Dovidio, supra note Ioo,
at 221-22; Nosek et al., supra note 5I, at 107-09.
102. Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The
Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERS'LTY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1464, 1473-74 (1998).
103. See Banaji & Hardin, supra note Ioo, at 139-4o; Blair & Banaji, supra note IOO; Kawakami &
Dovidio, supra note Ioo, at 220-21; Kristi M. Lemm et al., Gender Picture Priming: It Works with
Denotative and Connotative Primes, 23 Soc. Coo. 218, 218-19 (2005); C. Neil Macrae et al., On the
Activation of Social Stereotypes: The Moderating Role of Processing Objectives, 33 J. EXPMT'L Soc.
PSYCHOL. 471, 486 (1997); Moskowitz et al., supra note Ioo, at 170.
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automatically activated in people's minds when they encounter one
group more so than the other."4
Other studies have used different implicit measures to capture
stereotyping (e.g., memory tasks, linguistic tasks, construct accessibility
paradigms) and found conceptually similar results. 5 In several of these
studies both women and men expressed gender stereotypes equally
strongly at an implicit level; however when the same participants' explicit
beliefs were measured using questionnaires, women consciously
endorsed gender stereotypes less than their male peers." These types of
findings were initially obtained from student samples in laboratory
studies, but the results were subsequently replicated in large internetbased studies that recruited over 38,000 participants who were highly
diverse in terms of age, education, geographical region, profession, and
nationality."7
It is important to underscore, therefore, that scientific evidence that
cultural stereotypes can create implicit biases in individuals' judgments
and behavior is not limited to a single measurement tool or method (e.g.,
the IAT)."'5 Rather, in keeping with principles of good science,
researchers have utilized multiple methods to rule out limitations of
specific measurement tools and to generalize findings across many tools.
Studies have used a variety of different methodologies and converged on
the common finding that implicit gender stereotypes emerge in people's
judgments and decisions when measured in ways that bypass decision
makers' awareness of potential bias." For example, several studies found
that perceivers remember gender stereotypic information better than
counterstereotypic or neutral information without being aware of their
differential memory."' Moreover, they draw spontaneous inferences to
fill in unspecified details of men and women's social behavior in ways
1o4. See Banaji & Hardin, supra note oo, at 137-39; Blair & Banaji, supra note ioo, at 1142, 114548; Dasgupta & Asgari, supra note Ioo, at 642, 646-47, 65o-51; Kawakami & Dovidio, supra note ioo,
at 212; Moskowitz et al., supra note ioo, at 167, 173-74; Rudman et al., supra note oo; Rudman &
Glick, supra note Ioo, at 754-55; Lemm et al., supra note ioo, at 226-28, 231-32; Macrae et al., supra

note 103, at 478-82.

1O5. See Banaji & Greenwald, supra note too, at 192-93; Banaji et al., supra note ioo, at 278-79;
Richard L. Marsh et al., Gender and Orientation Stereotypes Bias Source-Monitoring Attributions, 14
MEMORY 148, 151-53 (2006); William von Hippel et al., On the Role of Encoding Processes in
Stereotype Maintenance, in 27 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 177-254 (Mark Zanna
ed.) (0995).
io6. See generally Blair & Banaji, supra note ioo, at i153; Nosek et al., supra note 51, at Lio.
107. Nosek et al., supra note 51, at io9-io.
io8. See, e.g., Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note i, at 1025.
io9. See Donald E. Campbell & Donald W. Fiske, Convergent and Discriminant Validation by the
Multitrait-Multimethod Matrix, 56 PSYCHOL. BULL. 81, 83 (959); Lee J. Cronbach & Paul E. Meehl,
Construct Validity in PsychologicalTests, 52 PSYCHOL. BULL. 281, 286 (955).
Itio. See Marsh et al., supra note io5, at 159; von Hippel et al., supra note 1o5 .
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that are consistent with gender stereotypes."' Again, this occurred
without awareness or malicious intent."2 As a case in point, Marsh and
colleagues found systematic differences in what people remembered
versus forgot depending on the speaker's sex and what he or she said." 3
Participants were presented with assertive or neutral statements that
were allegedly made by a man or a woman."4 When later asked to recall
who made what statement, they were more likely to misremember the
source of an assertive statement when the speaker was female rather
than male."'5 These gender-biased memory errors occurred regardless of
participants' degree of distraction or their capacity to pay attention,
which suggests that these gender-biased errors were occurring
unintentionally." 6
Sociological studies of the effects of the status and competence
assumptions embedded in gender stereotypes have also demonstrated
that these stereotypes can implicitly bias judgments and behavior, often
without the decision maker's awareness. ' The simple knowledge that
the person being judged is a man or women results in the perceiver
evaluating the same performance as better or worse, according to
gendered expectations."8 The subjects in most of these experiments were
college undergraduates."9 However, these experimental findings have
been replicated over decades of undergraduate populations, and have
also been shown to reflect the findings of similar experiments conducted
using representative random samples.'
These sociological studies are associated with Expectation States
Theory, which is the most widely accepted theory of how status
assumptions associated with group stereotypes affect people's behavior
and judgments in task-oriented situations such as in the workplace."'
III. David Dunning & David A. Sherman, Stereotypes and Tacit Inference, 73 J. PERS'LTY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 459,459 (i997).
112. See, e.g., id. at 469-70 (discussing whether or not "Tacit Inferences [are] Implicit").
113. Marsh et al., supra note 1o5, at I5I.
114. Id. at i5o-5i, 154, 156-57.
15. Id. at 151-52, 155-56.
116. See id. at 158; Banaji & Greenwald, supra note ioo, at 185.
117. See generally Cecilia L. Ridgeway, Gender, Status, and Leadership, 57 J. Soc. ISSUES 637, 63756 (2001); Cecilia L. Ridgeway & Chris Bourg, Gender as Status: An Expectation States Theory
Approach, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GENDER 217 (Alice H. Eagly et al. eds., 2004); Wagner & Berger,
supra note 94, at 1-32.
I8. See Ridgeway, supra note 117, at 646; Ridgeway & Bourg, supra note 117, at 228.
ii9. See Pugh & Wahrman, supra note 88, at 754; Wagner & Berger, supra note 94, at 7-1o.
120. See generally Shelley J. Correll, Gender and the Career Choice Process: The Role of Biased
Self-Assessments, io6 Am.J. Soc. 169i, 1702-03 (2001); Shelley J. Correll, Constraintsinto Preferences:
Gender, Status, and Emerging CareerAspirations,69 AH. Soc. REV. 93, 101-02 (2004).
121.

See generally JOSEPH

BERGER ET AL., STATUS CHARACTERISTICS AND SOCIAL INTERACTION

38-39

(I977); Joseph Berger et al., Status Organizing Processes, 6 ANN. REV. Soc. 479, 48o (98o); David
Wagner & Joseph Berger, Expectation States Theory: An Evolving Research Program, in NEW
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This theory argues that the status implications of gender (or other status
valued group characteristics) become salient when people in the situation
differ on the characteristic (e.g., a mixed sex setting) or when the task or
work domain is stereotypically linked to one sex or another (i.e., a
gendered task or setting).'22 When the status implications of gender
stereotypes are salient, they shape performance expectations that
individuals form for one another in task-oriented settings such as the
workplace. The more gendered the task or work domain, the stronger
the impact of gender stereotypes on performance expectations.'23 As a
result, performance expectations tend to modestly favor men over
otherwise similar women in mixed-sex but gender neutral professions.
For professions stereotypically linked to men (e.g., engineering, the
military), performance expectations more strongly favor men over
women. For others that are stereotypically linked to women (e.g.,
nursing), performance expectations slightly favor women, except for
positions of authority in which men are favored.' 4 These gender-biased
performance expectations unconsciously bias perceptions of others'
actual competence and merit. 5 Biased assumptions about competence,
in turn, affect people's willingness to listen to a person's opinions, to be
influenced by that person and to recommend the person for rewards.
Several decades of research support this pattern of implicit gender bias in
judgments of competence and the granting of influence and rewards.26
Aside from descriptive stereotypes, injunctive or prescriptive gender
stereotypes have also been found in empirical research such that people
express greater approval for communal qualities in the "ideal woman"
and agentic qualities in the "ideal man,' 27 and they express greater
approval for gender differentiated roles and responsibilities for women
and men."' Moreover, people increasingly judge certain behaviors as
appropriate for only one sex if those behaviors are typically enacted by

& Morris Zelditch eds., 2002).
See Ridgeway & Bourg, supra note 117, at 225; Wagner & Berger, supra note 94, at 4.
123. See Ridgeway, supra note 117, at 646; Ridgeway & Bourg, supra note 117, at 225.
124. Cecilia L. Ridgeway & Paula England, Sociological Approaches to Sex Discrimination in
Employment, in SEX DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE 194-95 (Faye J. Crosby et al. eds, 2007).
125. See Ridgeway, supra note 117, at 643.
126. See James E. Driskell & Brian Mullen, Status, Expectations, and Behavior: A Meta-Analytic
Review and Test of the Theory, 16 PERS'LTY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 541, 542-43 (1990). See generally,
Ridgeway & Bourg, supra note I17.
127. See WILLIAMS & BEST, supra note 93, at 279-81 (199o). See generally JANET T. SPENCE &
DIRECTIONS IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 41 (Joseph Berger
122.

ROBERT

L. HELMREICH,

AND ANTECEDENTS

MASCULINITY AND FEMININITY: THEIR PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS,

CORRELATES,

(1978).

128. See SPENCE & HELMREICH, supra note 127; Peter Glick & Susan T. Fiske, The Ambivalent
Sexism Inventory: Differentiating Hostile and Benevolent Sexism, 70 J. PERS'LTY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 491,

493 (1996).
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mostly men or mostly women.'29 Thus, it appears that people tend to
think that women and men ought to differ, especially in terms of
behaviors that are associated with larger sex differences. In these studies,
injunctive gender stereotypes about women in general and men in
general were explicitly endorsed by participants.'
2. Psychological "Fit"Between GenderStereotypes and Role
Stereotypes
Just as particular skills and behaviors are differentially associated
with women versus men, similarly particular skills and behaviors are
differentially associated with social roles. Some social roles are perceived
to require communal or interpersonally-oriented skills (e.g., caregivers,
nurses, and teachers), whereas others are perceived to require agentic or
achievement-oriented traits (e.g., workers, leaders, and managers).' 3 '
When women are in caregiver roles or men are in breadwinner roles,
gender stereotypes and social role stereotypes are in sync; the result is
the perception of a "natural fit" between the person's inner qualities and
role requirements.'32 However, when women occupy agentic roles (e.g.,
primary breadwinner), or men occupy communal roles (e.g., primary
caregiver), or one individual occupies both roles simultaneously, gender
stereotypes and role stereotypes are out of sync; the result is the
perception of a "psychological mismatch" between the person's inner
qualities and role requirements.'33 It is precisely in this situation of
psychological mismatch or role incongruity that the status and
competence implications of gender stereotypes are most likely to bias
people's performance expectations for the mismatched worker.'34
Role incongruity is evident in the case of professional women in high
status jobs and committed workers who are also primary caregivers. 3 '
The perceived incongruity between the individual's sex (and the status
and competences that it implies), and the requirements of his or her job
role, evokes implicit bias in judgments of the person's perceived
competence and promise in the role. In some circumstances, the
incongruity may also evoke more explicit "backlash" against the
mismatched worker. I"6 As our review below shows, most of the research
on this issue has specifically focused on evaluations of women in

See Eagly & Karau, supra note 9o, at 573-74.
130. See EAGLY, supra note 89, at 12-19; Eagly & Karau, supra note 90, at 573-74.
131. See EAGLY, supra note 89, at 19-24; Eagly & Karau, supra note 90, at 573-74.
132. See sources cited supra note 131.
133. See Eagly & Karau, supra note 90, at 573-74.
134. Madeline E. Heilman, Sex Bias in Work Settings: The Lack of Fit Model, 5 RES. ORG. BEHAV.
o.
269, 269-70 (1983). See generally Eagly & Karau, supra note 9
135. See Eagly & Karau, supra note 90, at 579.
129.

136. See id.
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professional leadership roles.'37 A smaller body of research has examined
evaluations of individuals
(women or men) juggling caregiving and
13
professional roles.
D.

BIAS AGAINST WOMEN LEADERS

i. Leadership Roles Are Equated with Masculinity
People typically construe professional leadership roles in a
masculine manner both in terms of the traits associated with these roles
(e.g., assertive, ambitious, competitive) and in terms of the physical
appearance that is conjured up when thinking about hypothetical
leaders.'39 In early empirical demonstrations of the association between
leaders and masculinity, researchers asked male and female managers to
give their impressions of women, men, or successful middle managers. 4 °
Participants perceived successful middle managers to be significantly
more similar to their impressions of men in general than women in
general. 4' In particular, successful managers, like men, were rated as

137. See infra notes 139-195 and accompanying text.
138. See SUZZANE M. BIANCHI ET AL., CHANGING RHYTHMS OF AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE 53-56 (2OO6);
JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO

Do ABOUT IT I-

6, 64-113 (2000); Sarah Avellar & Pamela J. Smock, Has the Price of Motherhood Declined Over
Time? A Cross-CohortComparison of the Motherhood Wage Penalty, 65 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 597, 603
(2003); Michelle Budig & Paula England, The Wage Penalty for Motherhood, 66 AM. Soc. REV. 204,
204 (2001); Kathleen Fuegen et al., Mothers and Fathers in the Workplace: How Gender and Parental
Status Influence Judgments of Job-Related Competence, 6o J. Soc. ISSUES 747, 747-54 (2004); Michael
K. Judiesch & Karen S. Lyness, Left Behind? The Impact of Leaves of Absence on Managers' Career
Success, 42 ACAD. MGMT. J. 641, 641, 643 (i99); Cecilia, L. Ridgeway & Shelley J. Correll,
Motherhood as - Status Characteristic,60 J. Soc. ISSUES 683, 683-84 (2004); Gillian Whitehouse,
Parenthoodand Pay in Australia and the UK: Evidence from Workplace Surveys, 38 J. Soc. 381, 382
(2002).
139.

See, e.g.,

BERNARD

M.

BASS,

BASS

& STOGDILL'S

816 (3rd ed.,

HANDBOOK

OF LEADERSHIP:

THEORY,

F. NIEVA & BARBARA A.
GUTEK, WOMEN AND WORK: A PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 82-92 (1981); Heilman, supra note 134, at
271-72; Madeline E. Heilman, Sex Stereotypes and Their Effects in the Workplace: What We Know and
What We Don't Know, IO J. Soc. BEHAV. & PERS'LTY 3, 5 (1995); Lenelis Kruse & M. Wintermantel,
Leadership Ms.-Qualified: The Gender Bias in Everyday and Scientific Thinking, in CHANGING
CONCEPTIONS OF LEADERSHIP 171 (Carl F. Graumann & Serge Moscovici eds., 1986); Patricia Yancey
Martin, Gender, Interaction, and Inequality in Organizations, in GENDER, INTERACTION, AND
INEQUALITY 208 (Cecilia L. Ridgeway ed., 1992); Veronica F. Nieva & Barbara A. Gutek, Sex Effects
on Evaluation, 5 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 267, 267-68 (1980); Belle Rose Ragins & Eric Sundstrom, Gender
and Power in Organizations:A LongitudinalPerspective, 105 PSYCHOL. BULL. 51, 52 (1989); Virginia E.
Schein, A Global Look at Psychological Barriers to Women's Progress in Management, 57 J. SOC.
ISSUES 675, 678 (2001); Sabine Sczesny et al., Masculine = Competent? PhysicalAppearance and Sex as
Sources of Gender-StereotypicAttributions, 65 SWISS J. PSYCHOL. 15, 16 (2006).
140. Virginia Ellen Schein, Relationships Between Sex Role Stereotypes and Requisite Management
CharacteristicsAmong Female Managers, 60 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 340, 341 (1975) [hereinafter Schein,
Relationships]; Virginia Ellen Schein, The Relationship Between Sex Role Stereotypes and Requisite
Management Characteristics,57 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 95, 96 (1973).
141. See Schein, Relationships,supra note 14o, at 341-43.
RESEARCH, AND MANAGERIAL APPLICATIONS
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self-42
having a host of agentic characteristics such as competitiveness,
ability to lead.
and
ambition,
aggressiveness,
confidence, objectivity,
43
These findings have been replicated both in the United States' and in
other countries including the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, China,
and Singapore.'" Similar results have emerged from46 studies in which
participants rated managers" 5 and political leaders' on agentic and
communal characteristics.
Female Leaders are Evaluatedas Less Leader-Like than Their
2.
Male Counterparts
Because most leadership roles are associated with masculine
attributes, and women are seen as possessing fewer of these attributes,
women are presumed to be less qualified for these roles than their male
peers are. This is the essence of Heilman's lack of fit model of
employment discrimination, "47 which is a close cousin of Eagly and
Karau's role incongruity theory. 48 The claims made by these models are
also consistent with arguments, premised on the expectation-states
theory, that there are stronger performance expectation biases against
women in male-typed roles or tasks.'49 The perceived lack of fit between
the professional role and the female worker's gendered characteristics
produces decreased performance expectations for her and increased
expectations for her failure on the part of her superiors, which in turn
lowers the worker's self-evaluation and her evaluation by others. 5 ° In
line with the lack of fit model, Heilman and her colleagues demonstrated
that although male managers rated female managers as more agentic and
less communal than women in general, they still thought that female
142. See id. at 342-43.
143. See, e.g., Madeline E. Heilman et al., Has Anything Changed? Current Characterizationsof
Men, Women, and Managers, 74 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 935, 937 (i89); Douglas Massengill & Nicolas
Di Marco, Sex-Role Stereotypes and Requisite Management Characteristics:A Current Replication. 5
SEX ROLES 56I, 565-66 (1979).
i44. Jean Lee & Tan Hwee Hoon, Business Students' Perceptions of Women in Management- The
Case in Singapore, 24 MGMT. EDUC. & DEV. 415,424 (1993); Schein, supra note 139, at 68o-81.
145. See, e.g., Daniel Arkkelin & R. Simmons, The "Good Manager": Sex-Typed, Androgynous, or
Likable?, 12 SEX ROLES 1187, 1189-94 (1985); Gary N. Powell & D. Anthony Butterfield, If "Good
Managers" Are Masculine, What Are "Bad Managers"?, 1o SEX ROLES 477, 477-78 (1984); Gary N.
Powell & D. Anthony Butterfield, The "Good Manager": Did Androgyny Fare Better in the i98os?, 14
GROUP & ORG. STUD. 216, 217 (1989); Gary N. Powell & D. Anthony Butterfield, The "Good
Manager": Masculine or Androgynous?, 22 ACAD. MGMT. J 395, 396-97 (979).
146. See, e.g., Shirley M. Rosenwasser & Norma G. Dean, Gender Role and Political Office: Effects
of Perceived Masculinity/Femininityof Candidate and Political Office, 13 PSYCHOL. OF WOMEN Q. 77,
77-78 (1989).
147. See Heilman, supra note 134, at 269.
o,
148. See Eagly & Karau, supranote 9 at 598.
149. See Ridgeway, supra note i17, at 647-52.
15o. See Eagly & Karau, supra note 9o, at 573-98; Heilman, supra note 134, at 269-98; Ridgeway,
supra note 117, at 642-50.
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managers lagged behind male managers in terms of fitting the mold of
the ideal successful middle manager.'
Does role incongruity and lack-of-fit between gender roles and
worker roles actually affect hiring decisions for female compared to male
job applicants? One way to test this question, while preventing the
contaminating influence of other possible explanations, is to examine
whether applicants with identical qualifications are evaluated differently
simply on the basis of the name on their resumes (i.e. a female name
versus a male name). This paradigm, originally developed by Goldberg,'52
has been used in a number of studies to examine hiring decisions of male
versus female applicants with equal qualifications.'53 In the typical study,
researchers presented resumes to participants; half the participants
received a resume with a female name attached to it whereas the other
half received the same resume but with a male name attached to it.'54
Statistical meta-analyses of such studies revealed that male applicants
were preferred over female applicants for jobs rated as male sex-typed
but females were preferred over males for jobs rated as female sextyped.'55
The beauty of these studies lies in the fact that they used an
unobtrusive method to uncover the presence or absence of hiring
discrimination without directly asking evaluators if they were biased
against female applicants. Because different participants evaluated
resumes of ostensible male versus female candidates, they were clearly
unaware that the sex of the resume holder was the critical variable that
biased their evaluations. Moreover, because the resumes were identical
except for the candidate's sex, they allow a causal conclusion to be drawn
about the effect of applicants' sex on hiring decisions. Taken together,
151. See Madeline E. Heilman et al., Sex Stereotypes: Do They Influence Perceptionsof Managers?,
to J. Soc. BEHAV. & PERS'LTY 237 (1995); Heilman et al., supra note 134, at 936; see also Richard F.

Martell et al., Sex Stereotyping in the Executive Suite: "Much Ado About Something," 13 J. Soc. BEHAV.
& PERS'LTY 127, 128 (1998).
152. See generally Philip Goldberg, Are Women PrejudicedAgainst Women?, 5 TRANSACTION 316

(1968).
153. See Heather K. Davison & Michael J. Burke, Sex Discrimination in Simulated Employment
Contexts: A Meta-Analytic Investigation, 56 J. VOCAT'L BEHAV. 225, 232-34 (2000); Alice H. Eagly et
al., Gender and the Evaluation of Leaders:A Meta-Analysis, III PSYCHOL. BULL. 3,7-9 (1992); Judy D.

Olian et al., The Impact of Applicant Gender Compared to Qualificationson HiringRecommendations:
A Meta-Analysis of Experimental Studies, 41 ORG'L BEHAV. & HUM. DEC. PROC'S i8o, 18o-95 (1988);
Janet Swim et al., Joan McKay Versus John McKay: Do Gender Stereotypes Bias Evaluations? 105
PSYCHOL. BULL. 409, 414-19 (1989); Henry L. Tosi & Steven W. Einbender, The Effects of the Type
and Amount of Information in Sex Discrimination Research: A Meta-Analysis, 28 AcAD. MGMT.J. 712,
713-19 (1985).
154. See Davison & Burke, supra note 153; Eagly et al., supra note I53;Olian et al., supra note 153,
at 184; Swim et al., supra note 153, at 414-19; Tosi & Einbender, supra note 153.
155. See Davison & Burke, supra note 153, at 235-37; Eagly et al., supra note 153, at 15; Olian et
al., supranote 153, at 194; Swim et al., supra note 153, at 414-19; Tosi & Einbender, supra note 153.
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these findings allow the interpretation that participants implicitly
discriminated against women simply on the basis of sex without
awareness or intent.
Even though many of the above mentioned studies were controlled
laboratory investigations where one might be concerned about external
validity, there are several reasons to be confident about the
generalization of resume studies to real world hiring decisions. First,
participants in many of these studies were managers or recruiters, not
simply college students."6 Second, a meta-analysis has shown that the
magnitude of bias in studies with student participants was statistically
equivalent to the bias found in studies with nonstudents.'57 Third,
naturalistic field experiments replicated these findings by sending fake
job applications to real businesses"58 or by having fake applicants respond
by telephone to real advertised jobs.'59 For example, in a study done by
Levinson, male and female students responded to classified
advertisements in two Atlanta newspapers for jobs that were either male
or female dominated.' 6' The majority of callers whose sex did not match
the sex of the typical job holders elicited discriminatory responses
including skeptical and discouraging reactions or outright refusals based
on sex. i6
Once hired into management or leadership positions, women often
find that decision makers use higher standards to evaluate their
competence and ability compared to their male peers even when both
objectively engage in the same behavior. A, In studies conducted by
Foschi, male and female participants first worked individually and then
in mixed-sex teams on the same task.' 63 Even though male and female
participants had achieved similar levels of performance while working
alone, once in mixed-sex teams, men judged their female team members

156. Olian et al., supra note 153, at 188.
157. Id. at 18o, 19o.
158. See Michael Firth, Sex Discriminationin Job Opportunitiesfor Women, 8 SEX ROLES 891, 89293 (1982); Shelby McIntyre et al., Preferential Treatment in Preselection Decisions According to Sex
and Race, 23 ACAD. MGMT. J. 738, 739-40 (1980).
159. Richard M. Levinson, Sex Discrimination and Employment Practices: An Experiment with
Unconventional Job Inquiries, in WOMEN & WORK: PROBLEMS & PERSPECTIVES 54 (Rachel Kahn-Hut et
al. eds., 1982).
16o. Id.

161. Id. at 56-6o.
162. See, e.g., Martha Foschi, Double Standards for Competence: Theory and Research, 26 ANN.
REV. Soc. 21, 21 (20OO) [hereinafter Foschi, Competence]; Martha Foschi, Double Standards in the
Evaluation of Men and Women, 59 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 237, 238 (1996) [hereinafter Foschi, Evaluation];
Martha Foschi et al., Gender and Double Standards in the Assessment of Job Applicants, 57 Soc.
PSYCHOL. Q. 326, 326-27 0994).
163. See Foschi, Evaluation, supra note 162, at 241-43, 248.
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to be less competent than vice versa.'6 4 Similarly, men evaluated their65
own competence to be higher than that of their female team members.
The women agreed-they too saw themselves as less competent than
their male partners.' 66 These and other studies by Foschi and colleagues
show that such "double standards," inferring disparate underlying ability
from performance, are evoked in any setting in which the status
implications of gender are implicitly salient, due to the mixed-sex setting,
as in Foschi's teams, or the gender-linked nature of the context.' Biases
in inferences about ability produced by these double standards are
especially strong for women performing male-typed roles or tasks."6
Again, these findings are not limited to lab studies with student
samples. Using archival data from real organizations, Lyness and
Heilman found virtually identical results when they examined the effect
of the sex of job-holders and the type of position (i.e., uppermanagement "line jobs" versus staff jobs) on performance evaluations,
and the impact of those evaluations on promotions during the next two
years.' 6' The lack of fit model, role incongruity theory, and statusexpectations theory all argue that there is greater lack of fit between
women's expected traits and skills and the requirements of uppermanagement line jobs compared to staff jobs. 7 ' Consistent with this,
Lyness and Heilman found that women in upper-level line jobs received
less positive evaluations than women in staff jobs or men in either type of
job. 7' Moreover, women were held to a stricter promotion standard than
men (as indicated by the fact that among promoted individuals, women
had higher performance evaluations than their male peers); and actual
performance mattered more for women's promotion than men's
promotion.'72 Researchers also compared "similarly situated" senior
executives who were male or female, using archival data, and found no
sex differences in wages, but significant differences in other job-related
"perks": women had less authority in their positions than men; they

164. Id. at 242-45, 250.

165. Id.
166. Id. at 241.
167. Foschi, Competence, supra note 162, at 24-32.

168. Janet K. Swim & Lawrence J. Sanna, He's Skilled, She's Lucky: A Meta-Analysis of
Observers' Attributions for Women's and Men's Successes and Failures, 22 PERS'LTY & Soc. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 507,508 (1996).

169. See Karen S. Lyness & Madeline E. Heilman, When Fit Is Fundamental: Performance
Evaluations and Promotions of Upper-Level Female and Male Managers, 9i J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 777,
778 (2006).
o
170. See Eagly & Karau, supra note 9 , at 573-76; Heilman, supra note 134, at 269-70; Wagner &

Berger, supra note 94, at 1,3-4, 8.
171. Lyness & Heilman, supra note 169, at78o-8i.
172. Id. at 781-82.
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received fewer stock options, and had less international mobility than
73
men.
Using a very different sample of workers, another field study
revealed virtually identical results. 74 Biernat and colleagues examined
U.S. army captains' judgments of their own and others' leadership ability
while attending a leadership training course. 175 After controlling for a
variety of status factors including merit and years in the rank of captain,
results showed that army captains evaluated their male peers as having
more leadership skills than their female peers. 76 This bias in favor of
male leadership was evident even in female army captains' selfevaluations, particularly when women were solos or tokens in their
team. 77
3. Backlash Against Female Leaders
In addition to receiving biased evaluations of their performance and
promise, female managers or leaders who are similar to their male
counterparts sometimes suffer other penalties because they violate
injunctive gender norms. Because these norms describe how men and
women should be, those who behave inconsistently with the norms may
be subject to sanctions. 7' To act as effective and powerful leaders in
masculine work domains, women as well as men are often required to
express high levels of agentic behavior (e.g., being directive and
assertive) and relatively lower levels of communal behaviors (e.g., being
sensitive and nice). For women, however, this pattern of behavior
violates the prescriptive gender role that requires women to be highly
communal. As a consequence, women leaders are often evaluated
harshly and evoke a hostile, backlash reaction when they engage in
highly directive behavior. 79 A woman's agentic qualities may be seen as
more extreme because evaluators use a within-sex standard (how
assertive is this woman compared to the average woman?), whereas the
same qualities in a man may be seen as less extreme because his behavior
173. See Karen S. Lyness & Donna E. Thompson, Above the Glass Ceiling? A Comparison of
Matched Samples of Female and Male Executives, 82 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 359, 360-6 1 (1997).
174. See Monica Biernat et al., All That You Can Be: Stereotyping of Self and Others in a Military
Context, 75 J. PERS'LTY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 301, 301-02 (1998).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 313-14.
177. Id. at 314-1 5 .
178. See Laurie A. Rudman & Kimberly Fairchild, Reactions to CounterstereotypicBehavior: The
Role of Backlash in CulturalStereotype Maintenance,87 J. PERS'LTY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 157, 157 (2004).
179. See Dor6 Butler & Florence L. Geis, Nonverbal Affect Responses to Male and Female
Leaders: Implications for Leadership Evaluations,58 J. PERS'LTY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 48, 49 (i99o); Eagly
et al., supra note 153, at 5; Madeline E. Heilman et al., Penaltiesfor Success: Reactions to Women Who
Succeed at Male Gender-Typed Tasks, 89 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 46, 417 (2004); Henry A. Walker et al.,
Gender, Interaction,and Leadership. 59 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 255, 269 (1996).

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:1389

is compared to a different, all-male standard.'
These negative
assessments have serious penalties for women's overall job evaluations
and future recommendations for organizational rewards as demonstrated8
by Heilman and colleagues using both student and managerial samples. ,
Measuring implicit attitudes using IAT reveals similar negativity
toward female leaders."' Specifically, Rudman and Kilianski found that
participants tend to express more implicit negative attitudes toward
female authorities as compared to male authorities.'8 3 Both male and
female students were faster at responding to negative compared to
positive words after seeing images of female authority figures (e.g.,
doctor, boss, judge) but responded equally quickly to negative and
positive words after seeing images of male authority figures.' Although
female students self-reported less bias against female authorities on
questionnaires compared to their male peers, both sexes showed equal
bias on implicit attitude tasks.' 8'
A second form of backlash against women in leadership roles is
evident in perceivers' differential reactions to self-promoting behavior
when it comes from women compared to men. Self-promotion makes
one's competence visible to others and, as such, is a component of an
agentic orientation. Women are typically more modest about their
successes in public than private self-presentations.'8 6 However, when they
do self-promote publicly, women suffer more negative consequences
than men do. Rudman conducted a series of experiments examining
people's reactions to men and women who described themselves in either
a self-promoting or self-effacing manner."' Results showed that when
women self-promoted by speaking directly and highlighting their own
accomplishments participants judged them as less likable, attractive, and8
hireable compared to men who behaved in an identical fashion.'1
i8o. See Monica Biernat, The Shifting Standards Model: Implications of Stereotype Accuracy for
Social Judgment, in STEREOTYPE ACCURACY: TOWARD APPRECIATING GROUP DIFFERENCES 87 (Yueh-Ting
Lee et al. eds., 1995).
I8I. Heilman et al., supra note 179 at 426.
182. Laurie A. Rudman & Stephen E. Kilianski, Implicit and Explicit Attitudes Toward Female
Authority, 26 PERS'LTY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1315, 1323 (2000); Laurie A. Rudman & Kimberly
Fairchild, Reactions to Counterstereotypic Behaviorn The Role of Backlash in Cultural Stereotype
Maintenance, 87 J. PERS'LTY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 157, 164 (2004).
183. Rudman & Kilianski, supra note 182, at 1323-24.
184. Id. at 1325-26.
I85. Id.
i86. Kimberly A. Daubman et al., Gender and the Self-Presentationof Academic Achievement, 27
SEx ROLES 187, 187 (1992); Laurie Heatherington et al., Two Investigations of "Female Modesty" in
Achievement Situations, 29 SEX ROLES, 739,740 (1993).
187. Laurie A. Rudman, Self-Promotion as a Risk Factorfor Women: The Costs and Benefits of
CounterstereotypicalImpression Management,74 J. PERS'LTY &Soc. PSYCHOL. 629, 629-30 (1998).
188. Id. at 640.
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Interestingly, in some situations female disapproval of self-promoting
women was stronger than male disapproval of self-promoting women."'
Discriminatory performance evaluations and backlash against
women leaders increases when visual cues such as pregnancy, feminine
dress, or physical attractiveness increase the salience of a professional
woman's gender rather than her profession, thus spotlighting the
perceived lack of fit between her gender role and her professional role."g
In other words, personal characteristics such as pregnancy, feminine
dress and physical attractiveness make women seem particularly
unqualified for leadership compared to their male counterparts -most
likely because these cues increase the accessibility of feminine
stereotypes.' Women's gender role and feminine characteristics also
become noticeable when they comprise a small numeric minority in the
workplace, which in turn gets heavily weighted in others' perceptions of
them.'92 Finally, when perceivers' cognitive resources are limited (under
conditions of distraction or multitasking), they are more likely to rely on
stereotypical beliefs such as gender stereotypes."
In many of the above mentioned studies on bias against women
leaders, decision makers may not have been aware of their disparate
treatment of women because they did not make comparative evaluations
of equally situated men versus women in the same moment. For
example, in the laboratory studies, different groups of participants
evaluated either a male job candidate or a female job candidate who

189. Id.
19o. Thomas F. Cash et al., Sexism and "Beautyism" in Personnel Consultant Decision Making, 62
J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 301, 309 (1977); Sandra Forsythe et al., Influence of Applicant's Dress on
Interviewer's Selection Decisions, 70 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 374, 378 (1985); Jane A. Halpert et al.,
Pregnancy as a Source of Bias in PerformanceAppraisals, 14 J. ORG. BEHAV. 649, 655 (993); Madeline
E. Heilman & L. R. Saruwatari, When Beauty is Beastly: The Effects of Appearance and Sex on
Evaluations of Job Applicants for Managerialand NonmanagerialJobs, 23 ORG. BEHAV. & HuM. DEC.
PROC's 360, 360-72 (979).
191. See sources cited supra note 19o.
192. RoSABETH M. KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 207 (1993); Madeline E,
Heilman, The Impact of SituationalFactors on Personnel Decisions Concerning Women: Varying the
Sex Composition of the Applicant Pool, 26 ORo'L BEHAV, & HUMAN PERFORM. 386, 393 (1980); Shelley
E. Taylor & Susan T. Fiske, Salience, Attention, and Attribution: Top of the Head Phenomena, in II
ADVANCES EXPMT'L SOC. PSYCHOL. 249-88 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1978); see also Alice H. Eagly et
al., Gender and the Effectiveness of Leaders:A Meta-Analysis, II7 PSYCHOL. BULL. 125, 140 (995).
193. Cf Daniel T. Gilbert & J. Gregory Hixon, The Trouble of Thinking: Activation and
Application of Stereotypic Beliefs, 6o J. PERS'LTY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 509, 509-io (1991) (showing reliance
on racial stereotypes); Arie W. Kruglanski & Tallie Freund, The Freezing and Unfreezing of LayInferences: Effects on Impressional Primacy, Ethnic Stereotyping, and Numerical Anchoring, 19 J.
EXPMT'L Soc. PSYCHOL. 448, 456-57 (1983) (showing reliance on ethnic stereotypes); C. Neil Macrae et
al., ProcessingLoad and Memory for Stereotype-Based Information, 23 EUR. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 77, 77-87
(1983),
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were identical on all dimensions except for their sex. 94' Participants were
unaware that their evaluations would be compared to those of others
who had judged a person that was identical except for his or her sex. 95 In
the field studies, researchers selected similarly situated professionals
from data archives, and compared their job evaluations, promotions and96
so forth after statistically controlling for all other confounding factors.'
Therefore, both the laboratory and field studies suggest that gender
biased evaluations of female professionals may often operate implicitly,
without decision makers' awareness or intention. Thus, had they been
asked, these decision makers were unlikely to have had the introspective
knowledge to report that the perceived lack of fit between gender role
and professional role was one factor that motivated their evaluations of a
female professional.

E.

BIAS AGAINST FULL-TIME WORKERS WHO ARE ALSO CAREGIVERS

People have mental representations of the ideal worker which
include characteristics such as long work hours, few absences from work,
few career disruptions, little caregiving responsibility, and willingness to
relocate.' 97 The image of the ideal worker, like that of the ideal leader, is
closer to the traditional masculine gender role than the feminine gender
role, largely because the feminine role links women, and especially
mothers, with primary responsibility for caregiving in the family.'9 As a
result, individuals who occupy a full-time working role but also have a
caregiving role at home that requires flexible work hours, absences from
work, and career disruptions are likely to be perceived as incongruent
with the ideal worker model. This begs the question: Is there any
evidence that the perceived lack of fit between caregiving roles
(feminine) and worker roles (masculine) produces discrimination against
194. Shelley J. Correll et al., Getting a Job: Is there a Motherhood Penalty?, I12 AM. J. Soc. 1287,
1287-88 (2007); Amy J.C. Cuddy et al., When Professionals Become Mothers, Warmth Doesn't Cut the
Ice, 6o J. Soc. ISSUES 701, 701-18 (2004); Fuegen et al., supra note 138.
195. See sources cited supra note 194.

196. Avellar & Smock, supra note 138, at 602-03; Budig & England, supra note 138; Joni Hersch &
Leslie S. Stratton, Household Specialization and the Male Marital Wage Premium, 54 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REV. 78,78-79 (2000); Whitehouse, supra note 138, at 381-82.
197. See WILLIAMS, supra note 138, at 1-6; Joan Acker, Hierarchies,Jobs, Bodies: A Theory of
Gendered Organizations.4 GENDER & SOC'Y 139, 145 (I990); George W. Albee & Melissa Perry,
Economic and Social Causes of Sexism and of the Exploitation of Women, 8 J. CmTY. & APPLIED Soc.
PSYCHOL. 145, 145 (1998); Rosalind C. Barnett, Preface: Women and Work: Where Are We, Where Did
We Come From, and Where Are We Going? 60 J. Soc. ISSUES 667, 667-68 (2004); Steven Mintz, From
Patriarchy to Androgyny and Other Myths: Placing Men's Family Roles in Historical Perspective, in
MEN IN FAMILIES: WHEN Do THEY GET INVOLVED? WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE? 24 (Alan Booth
& Ann C. Crouter eds., 2o00); Patricia, M. Rowe, Decision Processes in PersonnelSelection, I6 CAN. J.
BEHAV. SCI. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 326, 333 (1984). See generally SCOTT COLTRANE, FAMILY MAN: FATHERHOOD,
HOUSEWORK, AND GENDER EQUITY (1996).
198. WILLIAMS, supra note 138, at 30-31.
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employees who are caregivers? That is, are workers who give evidence of
being primary caregivers judged to be less competent or less desirable
workers, independent of their actual job performance?'
Research answers these questions in the affirmative. Judiesch and
Lyness investigated the impact of leaves of absence-many of which
were due to caregiving responsibilities -and managers' gender on their
career success and rewards including promotions and salary raises."
Leave characteristics included the length of time away from work, single
versus multiple occurrences, and leaves due to family responsibility
versus sickness.0 ' Results showed that leaves of absence predicted
significantly fewer future promotions and smaller salary increases,
regardless of the reason for the leave and regardless of the sex of the
manager."' Leaves of absence also negatively impacted managers'
performance ratings, but only if the leaves had been taken during the
year of the performance evaluation." This evidence suggests that leaves
of absence necessitated by caregiving responsibilities affect both male
and female caregivers. However, because women are much more likely
to be in the primary caregiver roles, they are more likely to require such
leaves of absence than are men. 4 Thus, the negative effect of leaves on
performance ratings is likely to be especially consequential for women
managers.
Other evidence also suggests that role incongruity between
caregiving and professional responsibilities hits women particularly hard.
Survey research found that mothers suffer a substantial wage penalty
(the motherhood penalty)." Statistical analyses using cohorts of women
drawn from national longitudinal surveys between I975 and i998
revealed that even after controlling for human capital variables and other
confounds, each additional child is associated with a negative effect on
women's wages.2" Moreover, this penalty has not diminished in the past
twenty years."0 Fathers do not suffer such a wage penalty and one study
suggests that they may even earn a "marriage premium..".
Extending beyond surveys, a number of audit studies and controlled
laboratory experiments have attempted to shed light on the causal
199. See Ridgeway & Correll, supra note 138, at 683-84.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Judiesch & Lyness, supra note 138, at 643.
Id. at 643-44.
Id. at 647.
Id. at 647-48.

204. BIANCHI ET AL., supra note 138.

205. See Avellar & Smock, supra note 138, at 603; Budig & England, supra note 138; Whitehouse,
supra note 138.
206. See Avellar & Smock, supra note 138, at 604; Budig & England, supra note 138, at 204-05.
207. See Avellar & Smock, supra note 138, at 604.
208. See Hersch & Stratton, supra note 196, at 78.
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explanation underlying this sex difference (i.e., is it caused by
discrimination or something else?)." 9 For instance, Fuegen and
colleagues found that mothers were held to stricter employment
standards than fathers."' Student participants evaluated a fictitious job
applicant who was either male or female and single or married with
children."' The applicant's qualifications were identical across all
conditions." ' Results showed that participants saw female applicants with
children as least suitable for promotions compared to male applicants
with children and nonparent applicants. 3 Male applicants with children
experienced an advantage in some domains; for example, in terms of
performance and time commitment, fathers were held to a significantly
lower standard for hiring compared to mothers and single individuals.214
Extending the same idea, Cuddy and colleagues found that working
mothers are evaluated as less competent but more warm whereas
working fathers are evaluated as both competent and warm. 5
Participants heavily weighted competence judgments in hiring and
2
promotion decisions, whereas warmth judgments did not matteri.
Thus,
working mothers' perceived loss of competence hurt their chances of
getting ahead professionally while their gain in warmth did not help
them.
Correll and colleagues found similar results in a coordinated pair of
laboratory and audit studies in which participants evaluated job
applications from two equally qualified individuals of the same sex who
only differed on parental status.217 The laboratory experiment using
student participants found that mothers were penalized in terms of
perceived competence, days allowed to be late, and recommendations for
hiring, management training, and starting salary.21' However, men were
not penalized for, and sometimes benefited from, being a parent. 9 In the
audit study, the same job applications used in the lab study were sent to
actual employers in response to advertised positions.2 0 Data from the
209. See Correll et al., supra note 194, at 1287-1338; Cuddy et al., supra note 194, at 707-08;
Robert Drago et al., The Avoidance of Bias Against Caregiving:The Case of Academic Faculty, 49 AM.
BEHAV. SCIENT. 1222, 1227-28 (2006); Fuegen et al., supra note 138; Lyness & Thompson, supra note
173, at 632-33.
21o. Fuegen, et al., supra note 138, at 745-46.
211. Id. at 741-43.
212. Id. at 747-54.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Cuddy et al., supra note 194, at 709-10.
216. Id. at 71o-1I.
217. Correll et al., supra note 194, at 1287-38.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id at 1327-32.
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audit study with real employers reinforced findings from the laboratory
study with undergraduate participants; that is, prospective employers
discriminated against mothers but not fathers.22"' Importantly, Correll and
colleagues found that the degree of bias shown by actual employers
towards applicants who were mothers was comparable to that expressed
by undergraduate participants in the laboratory study."'
Persistent practices in some workplaces may reinforce subtle gender
inequality, even though employers may explicitly report that they
practice gender equality. In a study examining five branches of a Dutch
bank, Benschop and Doorewaard used qualitative data to identify three
gender-biased practices."' First, they found that professional women with
children were more likely than any other group (i.e., women and men
without children, men with children) to be shunted into jobs with fewer
responsibilities and opportunities for career advancement (the mommy
track).2 4 Second, although very few women were present at top
managerial levels, their presence was frequently invoked to support the
argument that organizational practices were gender-neutral. 25 Third,
women were less likely to be encouraged to apply for high-level
managerial positions compared to their male peers.22
While much (although not all) of the research described above finds
that caregiving produces more penalties for women than men, other
research reveals a robust fatherhood penalty as well.2 7 The difference
between the situations in which men do not suffer penalty for their
parental status and when they do may turn on whether the men give
evidence at work of being primary caretakers rather than traditional
fathers who support their family through breadwinning and have
occasional caregiving responsibilities. For example, Butler and Skattebo
conducted a laboratory study examining the effect of a family Results
women. conflict
with work on performance appraisals of men and
showed that men who experienced a family conflict received lower
Id.
Id.
Yvonne Benschop & Hans Doorewaard, Covered by Equality: The Gender Subtext of
Organizations,19 ORO. STUD. 787,791-92 (1998).
224. Id. at 794-95.
225. Id. at 792-93.
226. Id. at 796-97.
227. See Tammy D. Allen & Joyce E.A. Russell, Parental Leave of Absence: Some Not So FamilyFriendly Implications,29 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. i66, 166 (i999); Adam B. Butler & Arnie Skattebo,
What is Acceptable for Women May Not be For Men: The Effect of Family Conflicts With Work on Job
PerformanceRatings, 77 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 553, 553 (2004); Linda K. Stroh & Jeanne M. Brett,
The Dual-EarnerDad Penalty in Salary Progression,35 Hum. RESOURCE MGMT. 181, 185 (1996); Julie
Holliday Wayne & Bryanne L. Cordeiro, Who Is a Good OrganizationalCitizen? Social Perception of
Male and Female Employees Who Use Family Leave, 49 SEx ROLES 233, 233 (2003).
228. Butler & Skattebo, supra note 227, at 553.
221.

222.
223.
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performance ratings and lower reward recommendations than men who
did not, whereas ratings of women were unaffected by the experience of
a family conflict. 29 Another study systematically manipulated an
employee's reason for taking leave from work (e.g., to care for a
newborn, a sick child, a sick parent, or no leave) and the sex of that
employee. 3 ° They found that student participants rated female
employees similarly regardless of whether they took leave or not.'
However, male employees who took leave for birth or eldercare were
seen as less likely to be helpful to their colleagues at work than their
male counterparts who did not take leave and their female counterparts
who took leave. 3' Moreover, male leave takers were evaluated,
"
' Some have
especially by male evaluators, as less compliant at work. 33
made the strong argument that although men's absence from work for
caregiving responsibilities may be protected by policies, it may, in some
cases, be viewed as less acceptable and more subject to sanctions than
women's absence. 34
F. RESEARCH EVIDENCE ON GENDER STEREOTYPE BIAS: CONCLUSIONS
It is clear, then, that a large and cumulative body of research has
shown that (I) gender stereotypes of men as agentic and women as
communal are broadly shared in the population; (2) when gender is
implicitly salient in a situation due to the mixed-sex nature of the context
or the gender-typed nature of the tasks involved, these gender
stereotypes enter into decision makers' evaluations of individuals'
performances, abilities, and suitability for hiring and leadership (unless
something is done to block their effects); and (3) gender stereotypes can
bias decision makers' judgments at an implicit level without their
awareness nor explicit endorsement of traditional gender beliefs.
The evidence that gender stereotypes often bias assessments of
competence and job suitability at an implicit level does not depend
merely on a single measure of implicit bias. Instead, studies using a
variety of measures and techniques have demonstrated the effects of
implicit bias on judgments and behavior, creating a broad research base
that spans several social scientific disciplines including psychology,
sociology, and organizational behavior. As a result, it is a mistake to
conflate the existence of implicit bias with any one measure such as the
IAT. By the same token, it is a mistake to assume that critiques of one
229.

Id.; see also Allen & Russell, supra note

227,

230. Wayne & Cordeiro, supra note 227, at 238.
231. Id. at 242.

232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See Stroh & Brett, supra note

227,

at 196.

at 184-85.
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particular measure such as the IAT undermine the entire body of
evidence showing the existence of implicit stereotypes and bias and their
impact on judgments and behavior in the workplace.
As summarized in this Article, the research supporting implicit
gender stereotypes includes laboratory experiments using undergraduate
participants, field studies of employment organizations, surveys of
managers and employers, audit studies of employers, and surveys of
representative samples of the American population. The findings of
these diverse studies are largely consistent. Furthermore, several studies
have allowed for direct comparisons between stereotypic bias found in
laboratory experiments with undergraduate samples and biases found in
workplaces with employer samples, and found comparable levels of
discrimination in both populations.
If virtually everyone is prone to gender stereotypic bias at one time
or another and such bias can affect decision making without the
conscious intent of the decision maker, is implicit discrimination
inevitable? The research evidence suggests that the answer is a strong no.
First, recent empirical studies have found that situations that draw
attention to successful women leaders or to egalitarian social norms
significantly undermine implicit gender stereotypic judgments.235 Second,
other studies have shown that individuals can, with conscious effort,
suppress the effects of stereotypes on their decisions' and tend to do so
under specific conditions. For example, when individuals expect to be
held accountable for justifying their decisions as fair and
nondiscriminatory, they tend to examine the bases for their decisions and
the impressions their decisions will make on others more carefully, with
the result that they block the biasing effects of stereotypes on their
decisions.236 Third, the impact of stereotypic bias on decision is reduced
235. Shaki Asgari et al., Reaching for Superstars: The Influence of Counterstereotypic Ingroup
Members on Self-Stereotyping (2008) (unpublished manuscript on file with the authors); Nilanjana
Dasgupta, Mechanisms Underlying Malleability of Implicit Prejudice and Stereotypes: The Role of
Automaticity Versus Cognitive Control, in HANDBOOK OF PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING, AND
DISCRIMINATION (Todd Nelson ed., forthcoming Oct. 2008) (on file with authors); Dasgupta & Asgari,

supra note Ioo, at 654.
236. See Susan T. Fiske & Stephen L. Neuberg, A Continuum of Impression Formation, From
Category-Based to IndividuatingProcesses:Influences of Information and Motivation on Attention and
Interpretation,in 23 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 150 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 199o);
Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of Accountability, 125 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 255, 259 (1999); Steven L. Neuberg, The Goal of Forming Accurate Impressions During Social
Interactions:Attenuating Impact of Negative Expectancies, 56 J. PERS'LTY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 374, 378-79
(1989); Steven L. Neuberg & Susan T. Fiske, Motivational Influences on Impression Formation:
Outcome Dependency, Accuracy-Driven Attention, and IndividuatingProcesses, 53 J. PERS'LTY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 431, 432 (1987); Philip E. Tetlock, Accountability and the Perseveranceof First Impressions,
46 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 285, 285 (1983); Philip E. Tetlock, Accountability: A Social Check on the
FundamentalAttribution Error, 48 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 227, 227 (1985); Philip E. Tetlock & Jae Kim,
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to the extent that the standards for evaluating competence and making
employment decisions are explicit and clear rather than ambiguous.237
Since formal procedures for evaluation in the workplace often clarify
decision standards, they tend to be associated with less stereotypic bias
and produce outcomes that are more equal for otherwise similar men
and women.38 If there are known conditions and procedures for reducing
stereotype bias in workplace decisions, then implicit bias becomes a
foreseeable danger that employers can be reasonably expected to take
steps to prevent.
III. SCIENTIFIC FIT
The vast literature on implicit bias has the potential to be relevant to
the law of discrimination in a variety of ways. As an initial matter,
however, if applicable law does not recognize implicit motivating factors
as relevant in the first place, this literature is rendered immaterial at the
start. It would not legally fit the applicable law. However, if motivating
factors under the law include more than simply what an actor can
honestly say motivated his or her behavior, then implicit considerations
are material to the question presented. The research legally fits the
pertinent law. But more is needed. The research must also scientifically
fit applicable law. In discrimination claims under Title VII, the research
might scientifically fit two separate issues. The first is whether the
research foundation is sufficient to inform triers of fact regarding the
general realities surrounding human cognition. Specifically, does the
research support the notion that some people hold biases of which they
may not be fully aware? If the answer to this first question is yes, this
leads to a second question. Specifically, does the research literature
indicate that experts can validly identify when a particular actor has
behaved pursuant to implicit bias?
Absent a clear statement from Congress, the reasonable
interpretation of Title VII is that it should track current knowledge
about human cognition based on the mind sciences.239 One of the best
demonstrated findings in social science over the last forty years is that
people do not have complete access to the reasons underlying their
4 People are not fully rational actors who systematically and
behavior."
Accountability and Judgment Processes in a Personality Prediction Task,
PSYCHOL. 700,700

52

J.

PERS'LTY &

SOC.

(1987).

237. Elizabeth H. Gorman, Work Uncertainty and the Promotionof ProfessionalWomen: The Case
of Law Firm Partnership,85 Soc. FORCES 865, 865 (2006); Heilman, supra note 139, at 3-26.
238. Barbara Reskin & Debra Branch McBrier, Why Not Ascription? Organizations'Employment
of Male and Female Managers, 65 AM. Soc. REV. 210, 210 (2000).
239. Krieger & Fiske, supra note i, at 1056.
240. See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, in CHOICES,
VALUES, AND FRAMES I (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds. 2000).
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consciously crunch data in order to achieve ideal or rational outcomes. It
appears, instead, that they use intuitive guidelines and intellectual
shortcuts -heuristics -to guide their behavior.24' People do not think and
then act; they act and then give reasons - rationalizations - for how they
have acted.
It may turn out, of course, that our understanding of human
judgment is incomplete and will need to be corrected as research
continues to be done. Such is the fate of all science. But Title VII
requires some theory of human cognition. Between the current state of
the art of the science and many lawyers' armchair theories of brain
function-which more nearly resemble the science of the eighteenth
century-the former seems preferable. Therefore, as regards the
legislative fact of what comprises the "motivating factors" that drive
human behavior, the law is well advised to include those factors that are
implicit. Moreover, as is true across wide swaths of the law, particularly
in civil actions, the approach that is consistent with science parallels
traditional practice in the law. Standards of conduct regularly demand
more from actors than simply their "honest" belief that they acted
reasonably; they require them to have acted reasonably in fact.
If the legally pertinent issue is whether protected group membership
was a motivating factor in the decision, and proof of implicit bias is
relevant to this determination, it remains to be considered whether the
research scientifically fits the case. This is a question of admissibility.
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence242 and the well-known decision in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,43 judges must determine
whether the basis for proffered expert opinion is more likely than not
scientifically valid.2" The Daubert Court suggested a number of factors
that might be considered, along with others, in making this
determination. 45 In particular, the Court stated that trial courts should
consider whether (I) the basis for the opinion had been tested
adequately, (2) the error rates were acceptable, (3) the findings produced
by the research had undergone peer review and been published, and (4)
the findings6 were generally accepted in the particular field from which
they came.4

241. See Thomas Gilovich & Dale Griffin, Introduction-Heuristicsand Biases: Then and Now, in
HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 2-3 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds.,
2002).
242. FED. R. EVID. 702.

243. 509 U.S. 579,592-93 (993).

244. Id.
245. Id. at 593-94.
246. Id.
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As noted in Part I, trial judges as gatekeepers must evaluate the
validity of the underlying research to each legal proposition for which it
is offered.24 As regards the matter of "motivating factors," this
evaluation involves two separate factual issues -the general findings and
their specific application to the case at hand. This basic dichotomy
between the general and the specific was first systematically described by
Professors Monahan and Walker for social science research in their
landmark article describing "social frameworks." ' They explained that
social science research ordinarily comes into court at two levels of
abstraction-as evidence describing a general phenomenon and as
evidence indicating that the case is an illustration of that phenomenon. 49
This means that research must be available to show the validity of the
general phenomenon-the social framework-and the research must
demonstrate that an expert can validly say whether a particular case is an
instance of the more general phenomenon. As discussed above, research
might very well demonstrate the phenomenon of the unreliability of
cross-racial identifications, but say virtually nothing about whether or not
a specific witness is mistaken in a particular case.25 The science
associated with describing a phenomenon in a population is
fundamentally different from what is needed to particularize that
knowledge to an individual.'
As Part 1I describes in detail, considerable research supports the
existence of the general phenomenon of implicit bias. There are a
number of aspects of this research that should give judges comfort
regarding the robustness of the phenomenon. First, it has been the
subject of many years of research attention."2 Dozens of studies over
several decades have demonstrated that implicit biases affect behavior.253
Second, scientists have investigated the phenomenon using different
research paradigms." 4 Researchers have not relied on just one measure
or single set of measures but have found the effects of implicit bias using
different measures and an assortment of experimental paradigms.5
Third, the studies come from many different laboratories involving large
numbers of researchers."' The results are not simply the findings of a
small and insular group of scientists. Finally, the findings fit well with
247. See sources cited supra note 22.
248. Walker & Monahan, supra note 32, at 559.
249. Id.
250. See supra notes 7, 25, 65 and accompanying text.
251. See Faigman, supra note 66, at 305.
252. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note I52 and accompanying text.
254. See supra note i56 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes io8-i6.
256. See sources cited supra notes 169-77.
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other research on brain functioning and human judgment. The brain is
not simply a computer that performs logical operations on stimuli
(meeting a job candidate) to produce rational responses (judgments and
actions), but instead often confabulates reasons to explain those
judgments and actions post hoc.257
Expert opinion regarding how implicit bias can operate as a
motivating factor that could result in a discriminatory decision appears to
readily pass muster under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert.
This framework evidence, given the state of the art of the science, should
be admitted. This does not mean, of course, that every study, or every
design protocol, demonstrates the phenomenon unambiguously. Indeed,
that is not how science works; science is a cumulative endeavor that
relies on the accumulation of multiple experiments that converge on the
same conclusion. Any individual study may be susceptible to some flaw
or some alternative explanation. But collectively, if the research reveals
the same finding across multiple methods, multiple samples, multiple
investigators, and multiple settings, then one can be relatively confident
about the veracity of those findings. Applied to the present case,
research from psychology, sociology, and organizational behavior used
multiple conceptual paradigms, methods, measures, and samples
(students, adults, employers) to illustrate that descriptive and
prescriptive gender stereotypes do indeed bias judgments and
evaluations of women compared to men in professional roles, and bias
judgments and evaluations of employees with primary caregiving
responsibilities. Under Daubert, the weight of the evidence, taken in
total, must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the
underlying basis for proffered expert opinion is scientifically valid."'
Social framework evidence regarding the behavioral implications of
implicit bias meets this threshold.
The research literature, however, does not indicate that an expert
could determine in a specific legal case that a particular decision was the
product of implicit bias. For example, research does not support a claim
that a particular test (a priming task, IAT, or any other device) could
accurately identify specific individuals who are motivated by implicit bias
in their decision making.259 The state of the art of the science simply does
257. See WILSON, supra note 37, at 4-5; see also supra notes 240-41 and accompanying text.
258. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,592 n.io (i993).
259. Professor Ian Ayres has suggested that the IAT could be used in a diagnostic fashion. See IAN
AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE? UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF RACE AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION 42425 (200) (suggesting that IAT scores might "be used as a criterion for hiring both governmental and
nongovernmental actors"). However, the developers of the IAT have clearly stated that this task has
not been validated for such use. Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring and Using the Implicit

Association Test: III Meta-Analysis of Predictive Validity, 95 J. PERS'LTY & SOC. PSYCHOL. (forthcoming
20o8); Brian A. Nosek et al., Pervasiveness and Correlates of Implicit Attitudes and Stereotypes. i8
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not allow us to identify whether a given individual's beliefs will predict
his or her subsequent behavior. Indeed, the task is even more difficult
when experts seek to explain specific past decisions?6 As is true in most
scientific arenas, the science in this area is not tailored to permit either
predictions or "post-dictions" of individual behavior. For example,
scientific research might tell us that a certain group has a high base rate
of gender stereotyping behavior, but this does not mean that scientists
can say whether any particular decision was a product of such bias. These
scientific findings are about aggregate trends in large and varied samples
and do not apply to each individual in those samples, though they apply
to the sample as a whole. Hence, scientific findings may be valid overall
but might not permit an expert to say with confidence whether a given
case is an instance of that general finding.
The existing research on implicit gender bias, therefore, should be
used to provide background information in legal cases on how people's
decisions tend to become biased by gender stereotypes without their
conscious intention. This does not mean that experts can state whether
the same research findings definitively explain a specific employer's
decisions in a specific circumstance. Such a specific application of
research evidence to one case violates the assumption of the scientific
method-i.e., the notion that scientific findings describe general
principles of human behavior under certain conditions but they may not
apply to every individual in those conditions. Hence, while experts might
be called to educate triers of fact regarding how implicit biases might
effect employment decisions, they should not be permitted to opine
about whether a particular employment decision was so motivated. This
judgment is ultimately for the trier of fact, and must be rendered based
on the totality of the evidence. General research regarding the science of
implicit bias is just one component of this inquiry.
CONCLUSION

In this Article, we consider the legal and scientific fit between
discrimination claims under Title VII and scientific research on implicit
gender bias. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides that scientific
evidence is admissible if it "will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue."6 ' This inquiry depends on both
the interpretation of the law and the import of the science. Title VII
provides that it is unlawful "to discriminate against any
EUROPEAN REV. Soc. PSYCHOL 36,36-88 (2007).
260. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PROVING THE UNPROVABLE:

THE ROLE OF LAW, SCIENCE, AND

SPECULATION IN ADJUDICATING CULPABILITY AND DANGEROUSNESS 42 (20n6)

the problem of proving past mental states).
261. FED. R. EVID. 702.

(considering, in general,
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63 Congress, however, did not
decision
employment
factor in the negative
specify whether the employer's motivating factors had to be explicit, that
is, specifically intended, or could be implicit.264 If motivating factors must
be explicit, the phenomenon of implicit bias would not be relevant and,
as a result, would be inadmissible. In effect, such an interpretation would
enact a specific intent requirement, and a defendant would not be liable
so long as he or she honestly believed that biases did not motivate his or
her negative decision. Neither the law nor the science of the mind,
however, supports such a crabbed interpretation of Title VII.
As regards the statutory meaning of "motivating factors," Congress
was silent on whether those were limited to explicit factors. There are
many good reasons to believe that the law was not meant to be so
constrained. First, specific intent is a highly restrictive cognitive standard,
rarely seen in civil cases and often not demanded even in criminal cases.
Congress's silence on this matter is telling, and suggests that the law was
not meant to create an unusually high standard of proof. Permitting
implicit bias as a component of actionable "motivating factors" would be
akin to a negligence standard, which is more commonly employed in civil
litigation. Second, statutes ought to be interpreted in light of the best
scientific knowledge of the day. The belief that cognitive processes
operate in a simple linear fashion, from explicit thought to intended
action, is anachronistic. It is largely uncontroversial among scientists that
this mechanistic view of brain function is incorrect. Considerable
psychological and sociological research demonstrates that people behave
pursuant to implicit motivations and, indeed, often provide post hoc
rationalizations for their behavior. 65 People do not simply think and then
act; they often act and then think. Third, the admission of evidence of
implicit motives will not open the floodgates to litigation, even if the
phenomenon of implicit bias is widespread. The issue presented in these
cases, as it is under principles of negligence law, is whether, in light of the
dangers posed by implicit bias, the employer acted reasonably. A
defendant's failure to take reasonable precautions against a foreseeable
danger might result in liability.
If the phenomenon of implicit motivation is relevant under Title VII,
expert testimony on this issue must be supported by "good grounds."2' 6

(2oo6).
263. 42 U.S.C. § 200oe-2(m) (2006); see Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94
262. 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-2(a)(I)

(2003)

(citing

Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 250-51 (1994)).

264. See sources cited supra notes 29-32.
265. See discussion supra Part II.
266. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (i993) ("The term [knowledge]
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Part II reviews both the psychological and sociological literature on this
subject. As is abundantly clear from this review, people's perceptions and
behavior are often shaped by factors that lie outside their awareness and
cannot be fully understood by intuitive methods such as self-reflection.
In this Article, we limit our review to gender biases, and describe a wide
range of prejudices that implicitly affect behavior, including deeply
embedded gender stereotypes and biases against full-time workers who
are also caregivers. This literature also belies claims that self-reports can
accurately describe motivating influences.
There is good reason to be confident in the robustness of the
phenomenon of implicit bias. The research literature is vast and deep. It
includes laboratory experiments using undergraduate participants, field
studies of employment organizations, surveys of managers and
employers, audit studies of employers, and general population surveys.
These diverse methodologies have largely converged to produce
consistent results. The research literature, therefore, amply supports the
conclusion that implicit gender stereotypes can motivate behavior.
In Title VII cases, of course, the ultimate issue is whether 67
a
particular employment decision was motivated by unlawful bias.
Although expert testimony can assist the trier of fact to make this
determination, the research literature on implicit motivations does not
give experts the diagnostic tools to say whether a particular employment
decision was a product of implicit (or explicit) bias. A clear-eyed view of
the science, therefore, well supports the admission of expert testimony to
educate triers of fact regarding how implicit motivation might affect
behavior. However, the ultimate question whether such bias was a
motivating factor in the particular case should not be the subject of
expert opinion. The science can give triers of fact a framework for
understanding implicit bias, but cannot specifically say whether or not it
contributed to a particular employment decision.

,applies to any body of known facts or any body of ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as truths
on good grounds.'" (quoting WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DicrIONARv 1252 (1986))).
267. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.

